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INGA MARKOVITS 
Justice in Lüritz 
I. The Project 
There is no Lüritz. But the place hiding behind this name exists: 
a town of about 55,000 inhabitants in that northern part of Germany 
that not so very long ago belonged to the German Democratic Repub- 
lic, now deceased. It is a pretty place with a large market square, 
some beautiful churches, the remnants of two city gates, a big ship- 
yard (since 1989 much reduced), a once lively port (now also with lit- 
tle traffic), and a number of picturesque Renaissance buildings 
sprinkled throughout the city. One of them houses the local magis- 
trate's court, the Amtsgericht . With one exception, all of its eight 
judges are West Germans. 
In the days of Socialism, another court was operating in the very 
same rooms and corridors: the Kreisgericht or district court, also a 
trial court. By 1989, its five judges adjudicated together about 1,000 
cases per year, a motley mixture of civil, criminal, labor and family 
law disputes. Today, four of these judges are attorneys in town; the 
fifth, still young and inexperienced when the Wall came down, was 
the only one to remain on the bench when the rule of law took over. 
In the Lüritz court's archive, socialist and capitalist caselaw stands 
side by side on shiny metal shelves (the old oak shelves were thrown 
out soon after reunification), and only the different color of the fold- 
ers, and the sudden increase in the number and thickness of the files, 
might tell a casual visitor that, around 1990, some important changes 
must have occurred in the city's legal life. 
Inga Markovits is "Friends of Jamail" Regents' Chair in Law, The University of 
Texas. This essay is the forerunner toa book on the rise and fall of socialist law in the 
GDR, reflected in the daily work of one East German trial court and in the exper- 
iences of the court's staff and its users. The court, located in a town that I call 
"Lüritz", holds in its archive records that cover almost he entire life-span of the GDR. 
These records, supplemented with interviews in town, provide most of the informa- 
tion on which this article relies. Since under German law, court records are not pub- 
licly accessible, I will not include any case-identifications i  these footnotes. I have 
also changed the names of all Lüritz citizens appearing in my story. Although they 
will remain anonymous, I am very grateful to the many eye witnesses to legal life in 
Lüritz without whose help this project could not have been carried out. 
I owe thanks, again, to the German Volkswagen Foundation for financing my 
many trips to Lüritz, and to the University of Texas Law School for providing me with 
time and peace for writing when it was most needed. 
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I found the Liiritz courthouse not by accident. After the GDR 
collapsed, an East German colleague had told me that, with the 
chronic staff shortages in the socialist administration of justice, many 
superannuated records could not regularly be weeded out, as the law 
required, and I might find casefiles in East German courthouses dat- 
ing back as far as 1945. An investigation of 24 trial courts in the 
former GDR eventually led me to the Liiritz Amtsgericht. At first 
sight, the building's size filled me with hope: a three-winged manor 
house built for the daughter of a duke more than 400 years ago, in 
which there surely must be enough space to have preserved the court 
files of four decades. And indeed, the Liiritz archive was well stocked 
with caselaw from the very beginnings of the GDR - not without 
gaps, but complete enough to allow me to survey the lifecourse of this 
legal system in one town. 
As I walked out of the courthouse after that first visit, I noticed a 
little door in the stairwell's wall, too low to allow an adult to enter 
without crouching. "That's the wood cellar," I was told. "It's where 
we keep our waste paper." After die Wende, the political turnabout, 
the court had not yet found the money to have its rubbish hauled 
away. The wood cellar turned out to be a dungeon-like room filled to 
shoulder level with discarded files. I spent my next Spring Break 
sifting through the paper-mountains and discovered ledgers and sta- 
tistics of all sorts, correspondence between the district court and the 
judicial administration, citizens' petitions and complaints, minutes of 
meetings at the court and elsewhere, personnel files, arrest warrants, 
work plans, judges' notebooks recording briefings held at higher 
courts - samples, and often more than that, of forty years of 
paperwork surrounding the daily activities of a socialist trial court. 
When I was a child, I used to play with the idea of stealing the con- 
tents of a mailbox àt a busy intersection in town, and, by reading 
every letter in it, learning what life was all about. Now, many years 
later, I had found my mailbox. 
Based on the Liiritz files, and on interviews with the court's for- 
mer staff and with its clients, I plan to trace the rise and fall of a 
totalitarian legal system in the legal experiences of ordinary men and 
women. I am not interested in the Party Congresses and Supreme 
Court decisions and in the twists and turns of the legal policies of the 
mighty. We know enough about those. I want to know what hap- 
pened at the bottom. Central decisions must be carried out by local 
people, and there is no reason to believe that the famous gap between 
law on the books and in real life did not also exist under Socialism. 
What did socialist justice and injustice mean to those who exper- 
ienced it first-hand? With socialist statute books and legal institu- 
tions now dead and gone, the place where the past survives is in the 
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habits and beliefs of the people who lived it. It is their legal past that 
I am looking for. 
Since this is work in progress, my report will deal as much with 
the difficulties I encounter along the road than with the final destina- 
tion of my project. There are so many chances to go wrong. The un- 
important heroes of my story leave less dramatic traces than their 
notorious rulers, and their "unhistoric acts"1 may easily be misinter- 
preted or overlooked. Coming from the outside, I may misread events 
and people. A foreign past is harder to make sense of than a more 
familiar one, and a totalitarian past is hidden under additional layers 
of deception and secrecy. Moreover, the fact that Socialism collapsed 
so rapidly and so completely under its own monstrous weight lends 
plausibility to capitalist claims of moral superiority that make it diffi- 
cult to perceive even local East German legal history in any but the 
bleakest light, and I must guard against my prejudices and precon- 
ceptions no less than against my gullibility. Much of what I say will 
be based on guesswork, on speculation, or on an arrangement of facts 
that another researcher might have arranged in a different pattern. 
But for present purposes, it is the enterprise itself that counts - the 
excursion into the daily life of the law in a totalitarian past - to 
which I invite you to come along. I know of no other socialist legal 
history in which the data allow us to get as close a view of "what 
really happened"2 as in Liiritz. 
II. Methods 
First, a word about my methods. The Liiritz files encase an en- 
tire epoch in the confines of two rooms - an organism, now extinct, 
that, like a fly in amber, miraculously was preserved for our inspec- 
tion. But there is nothing still and transparent about the Lüritz files. 
They are extraordinarily dusty, and despite their dust, they are filled 
with life. GDR court records are quite unlike their West German or 
American counterparts. American trials are recorded verbatim by a 
court stenographer but, because of the length and the costs involved, 
are only rarely transcribed and thus are usually not available in 
print. West German trial records, though always typed, refer exten- 
sively to the lawyers' briefs and deal only with the legal issues in 
controversy, ignoring the social context of a dispute, and while the 
record will be thick with proofs like bills, receipts, affidavits, and the 
like, it often is impossible to piece together all the evidence into a 
coherent tale. By contrast, East German trial records tell a human 
1. George Eliot, Middlemarch , Norton Critical Edition, Bert G. Hornback (ed.) at 
578 (New York and London 1977). 
2. Leopold von Ranke's famous quote "Wie es eigentlich gewesen" is cited by Pe- 
ter Gay, Style in History (New York 1974) at 68. 
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story, beginning at the beginning, and, frequently, not even stopping 
at the end.3 
Most plaintiffs and defendants wrote their own briefs, often by 
hand, explaining in their own words what had happened and why 
they had suffered an injustice that the court needed to correct. Few 
parties hired lawyers, and even if they did, the lawyers' briefs read as 
if dictated by their clients and are filled with moral outrage and with 
many exclamation marks. The oral argument was conducted in 
human, not legal language; indeed, socialist judges were constantly 
admonished by superiors to make themselves easily understood by 
every person in the courtroom. Trials were recorded not in stenogra- 
phy but longhand by a court secretary who in great haste took down 
as much of the proceedings as she could. Transcripts are often writ- 
ten in fleeting script and filled with abbreviations. But they also 
seem less guarded than a subsequent report might be because the 
time pressures did not always allow a writer to carefully choose her 
words. 
In criminal cases, judges began the trial by conducting lengthy 
examinations into a defendant's upbringing and his moral and politi- 
cal development. In all disputes, other people than the immediate 
participants often would add their voices to the story: witnesses told 
at great length of what they knew; co-workers of the defendants re- 
ported on their moral character and working habits. And even after 
the verdict, judges might discuss with parties how to deal with the 
results of a decision, or, in criminal cases, might hold post-mortems 
at a defendant's place of work to ensure that his work collective bene- 
fited from the lesson. Each Lüritz trial record thus embodies the 
story of a social conflict, often told from several angles, and its au- 
thoritative resolution by the court. 
Even the paper used contributes to the story line. In the immedi- 
ate post-war years, when everything was scarce, verdicts and briefs 
were written on anything that would take ink or fit into a typewriter, 
and if you turn a sheet, you might find on its back the text of a re- 
cycled judgment from bourgeois days or the raised fist of a socialist 
poster hero, now cut down to page size. When paper was available 
again, it still, for an impoverished judiciary, was so expensive that 
until the very end of the GDR the Lüritz court used half pages if the 
text did not require the space of a whole sheet. Typewriter ribbons 
and carbon paper were kept in service far beyond their usefulness, 
and on many documents you find that someone traced the letters 
with a ballpoint to make them visible at all. Photocopies, on silken 
yellow paper obviously not purchased from Xerox, offer only runny 
3. On the use of trial records as windows onto legal culture see Markovits, 
"Rechts-Geschichte," in  Peter Becker & Alf Ltidke, (eds.), Akten, Eingaben , Schaufen- 
ster : Die DDR und ihre Texte (Berlin 1996) at 259. 
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and blurry visions of a text. And the court's rank within the socialist 
pecking order is obvious from a comparison of stationery in the Lüritz 
archive, with the best paper used by state-owned enterprises (quite 
white and relatively firm and smooth), Party and union letters com- 
ing next in quality (a little rougher and with less body), and the 
court's paper at the bottom of the ladder (a brittle and porous gray- 
ish-white). Occasionally, the snowy letter of a West German attorney 
lies between the sheets. One wonders what the Lüritz judges must 
have thought, comparing the luxurious white of their ideological op- 
ponent's message with their own poor-man's gray. 
How do I read the files? Since I cannot study every single record 
in the archive, I read the entire yearly output of the court in three to 
five year intervals - spacing the distance shorter in eventful times 
(such as the building of the Wall in 1961 or the final years of the 
GDR) and longer in more tranquil periods. I pay as close attention as 
I can to people's own description of a conflict. I look for changes in 
procedure, in the use of political language, in references to the Party, 
in the precision, or lack thereof, of legal arguments. I keep a close tab 
on the court's staff, on the activity of lawyers, and on appearances of 
repeat players in the trial records. I count a lot - not just the obvious 
things such as plaintiffs and defendants, issues in controversy, and 
the like but also facts that might help me to understand the social 
meaning of a dispute. How close to each other are plaintiffs and de- 
fendants in private lawsuits? From the record, I know whether they 
live in the same or in neighboring houses. I know in many cases 
whether they are relatives or once were married to each other. Trac- 
ing their relations can give me an impression of the human proxim- 
ity, or distance, of civil litigation under Socialism. What kind of debts 
do plaintiffs enforce through litigation? I distinguish between per- 
sonal debts (based on, let's say, a personal loan or the private sale of a 
bicycle to a neighbor) and market debts (enforced by or against social- 
ist businesses) to learn something about the role of the economy and 
about the importance of money in East German caselaw. How often, 
in criminal cases, did the judge deviate from the prosecutor's sug- 
gested penalty? Changes over time will tell me something about the 
growth, or waning, of judicial independence within the socialist ad- 
ministration of justice. 
I supplement my readings of the files with interviews in town. 
The inhabitants of Lüritz tended to stay put: in socialist days, be- 
cause the housing shortage in the GDR made it next to impossible to 
find an apartment in another town; in capitalist days, because my 
informants, usually older people, in an economy of high unemploy- 
ment are unlikely to be lured away by jobs. As a result, I have been 
able to find eyewitnesses to legal life in Lüritz whose stories may go 
back as far as the 1950s. I have interviewed many of the judges who 
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served on the Lüritz bench: the court's last director, a smart, ener- 
getic, and bitter woman; her predecessor, a gloomy man who left the 
court in 1984, "fed up with everything"; their younger colleagues, dis- 
illusioned even before the fall of Socialism. My best eyewitness is 
Frau Riiter, now 82, who joined the court in 1953 as a "people's judge" 
(one of those trusted proletarians trained in crash courses to replace 
the Nazi judges whom the East German government kicked out soon 
after the war)4 and who stayed on the bench until 1980. I have ques- 
tioned notables in town about their use of and their opinions about 
the law: the man who for 25 years was First Party Secretary in the 
district - under Socialism, the local Prince - and who died in 1999 
without so much as an obituary in the local paper; his liaison to the 
court and other "organs of order and security," a mousy, respectful 
man; the head of the city's feared Department for Interior Affairs, a 
graduate of the Stasi Academy near Berlin, who in the tumultuous 
fall of 1989 was denounced by his own son on the Lüritz market 
square. It seems as if I even know those judges now long dead or 
gone, whose handwriting and reasoning styles I recognize in the files, 
and whose portraits Frau Rüter has drawn for me. There is her 
friend Judge Haas, for instance, a war widow with two small chil- 
dren, like Frau Rüter a "people's judge," who joined the court in 1951, 
whom I already knew from her decisions to be a warm-hearted and 
resolute believer in Socialism. And there is a cast of other characters: 
Judge Lindemann, another early "people's judge," who under Hitler 
had spent years in concentration camp and who was always sick; 
Judge Lübtow, a rare bourgeois holdover from the past ("but always 
helpful if you had a tricky legal problem"); Judge Gustafsen (who 
lived in the little flat in the courthouse's attic and who drank too 
much); Judge Schmalz, a self-righteous ideologue to whom I had 
taken a disliking in the files and whom Frau Rüter did not care for 
either ("a slimebag"). These are the actors of my drama and the files 
my script. What can I learn from them? 
III. Problems 
1. What can I learn from court files in the first place? Litigation 
reflects the malfunctionings of social life: crimes, divorces, evictions, 
firings, people breaking their promises. Court cases do not tell us 
about the marriages that work, the employees who conscientiously do 
their job, the vast majority of people who do not break the law. 
Would I have been better off stealing my mailbox after all? But even 
the negative selection of life-stuff that one finds accumulated in the 
archive of a trial court reflects the social context from which the sam- 
4. On "people's judges" see Feth, "Die Volksrichter," in, Hubert Rottleuthner, 
(ed.), Steuerung der Justiz in der DDR (Köln 1994) at 351; Julia Pfannkuch, 
Volksrichter ausbüdung in Sachsen 1945 - 1950 (Frankfurt a.M. 1993). 
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ples have been taken. My civil litigation files, for instance, tell me 
what the citizens of Lüritz considered to be worth a fight. They tell 
me who fought whom; who looked to the law for help and how easy or 
difficult it was for the contestants to get into court. I can learn from 
my files how this society resolved at least some of its conflicts and 
how religiously it kept to its own rules. My files reflect what Lüritz 
people meant by justice. What did they think the law owed them? 
When did they feel that their rights were violated? And every one of 
these records mirrors the authority relationship between the Lüritz 
citizen and their socialist state: the court's parental,5 and often, 
plain authoritarian conviction that citizens needed education and 
guidance and the citizen's responses to that claim, a changing mix- 
ture of deference, timidity, resignation, manipulation, and, surpris- 
ing often, cheeky self-assertion. 
Moreover, since these are trial records of a state that believed in 
planning, the Lüritz files contain a lot of information solicited not 
necessarily to resolve the case at hand but to inform the state's social 
engineering goals at large. Both parties to a divorce suit, for exam- 
ple, had to fill out lengthy questionnaires about their married life and 
about the causes for its disintegration. Their statements provide tell- 
ing information not only about basic social data (such as the compar- 
ative incomes and education of men and women) but also about the 
personal relationships of men and women under Socialism. "What 
was the state of gender equality in your marriage?" one of the plan- 
ners' questions asked, separately, of each spouse. "No problem, I al- 
ways helped with the dishes," most men replied. "No problem, he 
always helped with the dishes," most women wrote. And I, reading 
their responses decades later, for a minute feel sympathy for the so- 
cialist state that found it so difficult to impress notions of gender 
equality upon a traditional and parochial people. 
There are many other instances in which the files throw light on 
matters far beyond an individual dispute. Arrest warrants, for exam- 
ple, contained the question whom to inform about a suspect's impris- 
onment. Most of those apprehended named a relative. Many said: 
"nobody." But in reading hundreds of arrest warrants I have not 
found a single case in which somebody said: "my lawyer." Whatever 
lawyers did for their clients under Socialism, they were not consid- 
ered natural allies against the state. In fact, wherever I look, the 
Lüritz trial records are full of information about everyday life in the 
GDR. Labor law case files tell about the working conditions in enter- 
prises. State suits to terminate parental rights are filled with infor- 
5. The term "parental law" was coined to Harold Berman who was the first o 
analyze the peculiar mixture of authoritarian control and solicitude in socialist legal 
systems. See Harold Berman, Justice in Russia. An Interpretation fSoviet Law 
(Cambridge 1950). 
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mation about child-rearing patterns and problems. Witnesses' 
testimony in divorce suits provide glimpses into socialist work-a-day 
reality. "I'm living right above them and I can hear everything," a 
neighbor might testify in a divorce case, informing the judge about 
the couple's fights and me about the fragile privacy within the thin 
walls of socialist pre-fab apartment houses. 
2. So I can learn something from the Lüritz files that speaks of 
more than the pathology of daily life. But can I trust the files? After 
all, this was a totalitarian state that kept its dirty secrets under 
much tighter wraps than a democracy is able to do. For example, 
"political" cases were not handled by the Lüritz District Court but by 
a trial court in the regional capital or - in more serious cases - by a 
special panel at the regional Court of Appeals. That might mean that 
the most troubling legal incidents in Lüritz cannot be researched in 
the Lüritz archive and that my view of local justice under Socialism 
might be too rosy. 
Today, most case files involving crimes against the state that 
were committed by Lüritz citizens are stored by the prosecutor's of- 
fice in the regional capital. Those dealing with offenses investigated 
by the secret police are held by the Stasi Archive (also called Gauck 
Archive after its first director, the East German pastor Joachim 
Gauck) in Berlin or by one of its regional branch offices. I followed 
my political defendants from Lüritz to both locations. Access to se- 
cret police files of the former GDR for researchers is fraught with 
complications, and I could do no more than spot checks on my Lüritz 
subjects in the Stasi Archive.6 But the prosecutor's office in the re- 
gional capital today still holds a complete set of index cards from the 
GDR Court of Appeals that contains the names, addresses, offenses, 
and sentences of all "political" defendants in the region since 1969. 
Checking for Lüritz addresses, I could determine the number of peo- 
ple from my town whose crimes were considered so threatening to the 
state that they could not be handled back in Lüritz but had to be 
adjudicated by the more reliable and distant courts in the regional 
capital. 
Their numbers turned out to be far lower than I had expected. 
On average, not more than 1% to 2.5% of the annual criminal 
caseload of the Lüritz trial court (or 2 to 10 cases of a yearly caseload 
6. Under the Sfosř-Records Act of 1991, only Stasi victims have unrestricted ac- 
cess to their files. Researchers can use victim files only if the victim consents or if all 
identifying details in a file have been expunged. The process requires multiple xerox- 
ings of each page and places the selection of the files and the choice of whether and 
how fast to copy often copious records into the hands of academically untrained 
Gauck-Archive p rsonnel. See Gesetz über die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdien- 
stes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik of Dec. 20, 1991, 
Bundesgesetzblatt (henceforth BGBl.) I 2272 (1991) and Markovits, "Selective Mem- 
ory: How the Law Affects What We Remember and Forget About he Past," 35 Law & 
Society Review 513 (2001). 
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of 400 to 500 prosecutions) dealt with Stosi-investigated cases that 
were adjudicated out of town.7 To judge by the case files in the prose- 
cutor's office, the crucial criterion for separating regional from local 
defendants or black sheep from gray was not their type of offense 
("resistance to state authority," for instance, was routinely handled 
by my trial court) nor the severity of the offense (penalties handed 
out in the regional capital were not necessarily higher than those the 
defendant could expect from the court in Liiritz) but a case's potential 
to cause political embarrassment. Workers and peasants who "re- 
sisted state authority while drunk would be prosecuted in town. A 
middle-class defendant or that rare troublemaker who was sober 
when he got into a fight with the police might find himself in court in 
the regional capital. Chance played a role as well, and on a number 
of occasions the court in the regional capital returned a case that 
seemed sufficiently innocuous to the Lüritz Kreisgericht. 
While comparing my records from the prosecutor's office and the 
Kreisgericht, I also made another discovery, more significant for this 
project. My own assessment of what makes a case "politically embar- 
rassing" is not the same as that of East German law officials at the 
time. They seem to have removed from local view all those offenses 
that might upset the town's inhabitants or that they feared might 
become sensational copy for a Western journalist. Though under 
GDR rules of procedure, the public, under fairly easy pretexts, could 
be excluded from a local trial8 and often was, even then word of a 
troublesome event might get around more easily in a defendant's 
home town than in the more distant and anonymous regional capital. 
As I read the files, the choice of which branch of the police to have 
investigate a case and where to try it most easily can be explained by 
the desire to protect the political reputation of the GDR, with "repu- 
tation" understood in a narrow and, frankly, bourgeois sense as keep- 
ing up appearances, avoiding scandal, and, above all, not dirtying 
one's own nest. 
But I, coming from a different time and place, find those offenses 
that reveal an actor's discontent and disagreement with the state 
much less "politically embarrassing" than those prosecutions that re- 
veal the GDR's betrayal of its own hopes for a new society and that 
show its authoritarian and parental disregard for the autonomy of its 
citizens. Judged by those criteria, most "politically embarrassing" of- 
7. Drawing on secret police statistics, Professor Rottleuthner reports that, in the 
entire GDR, roughly 3% of all criminal investigations were undertaken by the Stasi. 
See Rottleuthner, "Steuerung der Justiz in der DDR," in Ulrich Drobnig, (ed.), Die 
Strafrechtsjustiz der DDR im Systemwechsel (Berlin 1998) at 26. 
8. Strafprozessordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure, henceforth StPO) of the 
GDR of Jan. 12, 1968, Gesetzblatt der DDR (henceforth GBl.) I p. 49 § 211 para. 3: 
"The court can. . .exclude the public if public deliberations would endanger state se- 
curity or if the need to keep certain facts secret so requires." 
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fenses were investigated by the regular police and tried in Lüritz. At- 
tempts to "flee the Republic," for example, were so commonplace and, 
it appears, so indisputably considered crimes, that most of them were 
handled by the Lüritz Kreisgericht. Parasitism or "a-social behav- 
ior,"9 - that is: the intentional avoidance of work - (to me an offense 
reeking of Socialism's obsession with controlling all aspects of a 
person's life) to contemporary Lüritz authorities did not appear "po- 
litical" at all but rather as the obvious infringement of an unquestion- 
able social obligation. Truants thus were regularly tried in Lüritz 
and, at the peak of its prosecution, "a-social behavior" made up more 
than two fifths of the Lüritz criminal caseload. That means that even 
with the most awkward cases spirited away to the regional capital, 
enough politically touchy conduct was adjudicated by the Lüritz 
Kreisgericht to give me a fairly balanced picture of socialist political 
justice at the grass-root level. 
3. But what about "telephone" law? We all have heard of the 
practice, said to have been common among socialist bosses of all 
types, of reaching for the nearest phone to tell a judge how the caller 
expected him or her to decide a particular case. Such telephone calls 
are unlikely to have been recorded by their recipients. I have never 
found a note suggesting such a phone call in my Lüritz records. Nor 
did the practice of higher courts of supervising and directing the deci- 
sion-making processes of lower courts10 leave obvious traces in the 
Lüritz case-files. If the regional Court of Appeals decided, as it was 
called, "to exercise control" over a local trial (most likely in cases that 
for one reason or another were considered sensitive), it would inform 
the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice of its intentions, out- 
line its procedural strategy, and often ask advice from its superiors. 
But the supervision would leave no mark on the trial record in my 
Lüritz archive. Nor do my records tell me whether the Lüritz court 
itself avoided political trouble by looking for an out-of-court "political 
solution" to a dispute whose legal resolution might have caused em- 
barrassment. Only in rare instances, due more to oversight and 
blunder than intention, will I be able to detect the fingerprints of offi- 
cial meddling in the Lüritz files. 
Still, there are telltale signs that can alert a reader of these 
records to the possibility of outside interference with a case. Some- 
times, I find a little slip between the pages of a trial record, no bigger 
9. § 249 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code) of the GDR of Jan. 12, 1968 in the ver- 
sion of Dec. 19, 1974, GBl. I p. 14 (henceforth StGB/GDR) provided penalties of up to 
three years in prison for those who "infringed upon the public order by avoiding regu- 
lar work." By penalizing "parasitism" and "a-social behavior", GDR criminal policy 
followed in the footsteps of Nazi law; see Wolfgang Ayaß, " Asoziale " im Nationalsozi- 
alismus (Stuttgart 1995). 
10. See the collection of studies in Hubert Rottleuthner, (ed.), Steuerung der 
Justiz in der DDR (Köln 1994). 
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than a dry cleaner's receipt, by which the regional court announced 
the return of a particular case-file to the Lüritz archive. Most likely, 
these are cases in which the regional court decided to "exercise con- 
trol" over a local trial and needed to see the record. My Lüritz case- 
files will keep mum about why the regional court was interested in 
the case and what solution to the dispute it was advocating. But 
since the regional court reported regularly to the GDR Ministry of 
Justice, I can find its reports, including those concerning the Lüritz 
Kreisgericht, in the collection of documents from central GDR author- 
ities now held by the Federal Archives in Berlin. 
Sometimes a time-gap in the progress of a Lüritz case arouses 
my suspicion. A suit is filed, the legal process is beginning to take its 
course, but then, out of the blue, the court suspends the case for half 
a year after which the suit is either dropped or dismissed. In many of 
these instances, there may have been an innocent explanation for the 
delay: the parties may have asked the court for time in order to work 
out a settlement. But it is also possible that the court itself initiated 
the delay or stalled the process on instructions from the supervising 
Court of Appeals in order to enlist the help of government or Party 
officers to resolve a conflict out of court that it did not want to subject 
to the authority of legal rules or the publicity of even an East German 
oral argument and trial. This does not necessarily mean that the 
parties got more, or less, than if the dispute had been terminated by a 
judgment. But it means that the conflict was resolved by way of 
politics, not law, and that it could be kept out of the public and, many 
years later, the researcher's, eye. One could compare the outcome to 
a settlement, but a settlement not driven by the parties' wish to cut 
the risks of losing but by the Party's wish not to lose face. Again, I 
will not know from the Lüritz record what it was that worried the 
trial court or that attracted the superior court's attention. All I have 
to go on is a vague suspicion caused by an unexplained delay. With 
luck, I might, again, discover its reason in the regional Court of Ap- 
peals reports held by the Federal Archives in Berlin. 
And finally, there are cases in which the facts themselves pique 
my curiosity. A fight between two wealthy Lüritz doctors over the 
height of a hedge between their gardens is finally resolved when the 
GDR Ministry of the Environment furnishes one of the parties with a 
letter emphasizing the desirability of preserving the hedge in an un- 
trimmed state. Why should the Ministry bother about a law suit of 
two small town doctors unless at least one of them had friends in high 
places? The manager of a large state-owned chicken farm is con- 
victed of an economic crime for ordering the destruction of 40,000 
newly hatched birds when every chicken-processing factory in the 
country, already burdened by quantities of unsold chicken products, 
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refuses to accept additional chickens. Who chose him as the desig- 
nated villain in this economic mess? 
The records held by the Federal Archives in Berlin help me to 
understand the regular, work-a-day supervision of local courts by the 
superior Courts of Appeal. But for the more suspicious cases, those 
with a whiff of favoritism or corruption that goes beyond the ordinary 
exercise of democratic centralism, written traces of someone's med- 
dling are hard to find. Since "telephone law" allowed local bosses to 
contravene or by-pass central policies, it was officially disapproved of 
in the GDR. I was told by several former judges that trial judges, 
without real danger to themselves, could resist the attempts of local 
big-shots to dictate their decisions. That does not necessarily mean 
that judges did resist, nor does it mean that central authorities, if 
need be, did not rely on modes of interference that they would criti- 
cize if used by their subordinates. This was a legal system in which 
right outcomes - with "right" defined by those in power - mattered 
more than procedure, and many functionaries at all levels were will- 
ing to break the rules, with or without the pangs of a bad conscience, 
to please their higher-ups. How can I know about those cases? 
If my suspicion is aroused, by asking. I have spoken with both 
doctors in the hedge case and learned that both pulled Party strings 
to win their case and that one of the contestants enlisted the help of 
the secret police for whom he worked as an informer. I questioned 
the manager of the chicken farm about his conviction and was shown 
the copy of a speech by Honecker in which the First Secretary railed 
against the "capitalist" perversion of destroying food stuffs for which 
the market had no demand. I spoke with the judges involved and 
with other judges who had heard and gossiped about these cases. Ob- 
viously, I can research only a few cases in depth. But my interviews 
teach me about the setting in which the judges and parties operated. 
I learned from conversations with former Party functionaries 
about the "security conferences" in Liiritz at which, under the chair- 
manship of the local chief prosecutor, representatives of the Party 
Secretariat, the Police Department, the Department of the Interior, 
the Secret Police, and yes, the Director of my Kreisgericht met once a 
month to discuss "security issues" in the district: a rise in juvenile 
delinquency, or in the number of people caught while attempting to 
"flee the Republic," for instance; a spate of unexplained fires in the 
region, or the recent lawsuit of a dozen workers from the shipyard 
challenging the miscalculation of their annual bonuses. Anything 
that might cause "unrest" in town, that could affect the performance 
of local industries, that hinted at the possibility of civic discontent, or, 
worse, opposition, thus, once a month, would be the subject of a meet- 
ing of those in town who exercised the state's control over its citizens. 
The court was considered one of the socialist "security forces." It is 
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likely that the participants of these conventions regularly discussed 
some cases on the docket of the Lüritz Kreisgericht. 
What would happen? I can guess. Take the case of the shipyard 
workers joining up to sue their socialist employer over bonuses. So- 
cialist authorities disliked group actions: perhaps because they 
smelled of insurrection, and the rise of such cases in the 1980s in the 
GDR (quite a few of them in Lüritz) signaled trouble. The Lüritz 
court director very likely would mention the new case at the monthly 
"security meeting." Quite possibly, the Party Secretariat had already 
been informed. Those present at the meeting might think it best to 
defuse the issue by resolving the plaintiffs' problems out of court. 
The court would help by gaining its non-judicial colleagues time and 
would delay the hearing of the case. That much I know from several 
reports by the superior regional court in the Ministry of Justice's 
records in Berlin in which the regional court advises the Ministry of 
Justice of the filing of such suits in Lüritz or elsewhere and informs 
the Ministry that a date for trial has not yet been set and that local 
authorities are looking for "a political solution" to the dispute. Mean- 
while in Lüritz, the court might orchestrate a meeting of state and 
enterprise officials who, with the assistance of the Party, could work 
out a compromise that halfway met the plaintiffs' expectations. A 
settlement of sorts, you might well say, although again one driven not 
so much by the parties as by the Party's obsession with complete con- 
trol. The plaintiffs would eventually withdraw their suit - as the 
court record of the case will tell me. The rest of my story is built on 
interviews and guesswork. Reconstructing the political influence on 
court decisions is not a matter of putting two and two together: too 
many parts of the equation are missing. Rather, the researcher 
works like an archaeologist, rebuilding the remaining shards of an 
ancient vessel, while guessing, from the shape and curve of each frag- 
ment, at the pot's original shape. My interviews are indispensable 
for divining the outlines of my object of construction. Every piece 
counts. I learn, for instance, from a former court director that, al- 
though he was not friends with the two attorneys in town, he regu- 
larly met to play cards with the head of the city's Interior 
Department. "Aha," I think. Another chance for him to discuss a 
tricky case with the head of police and another bit of evidence for me 
to add to my collection of pottery shards. 
4. But can I trust the people whom I interview? After all, they 
may lie to me. More innocently, they may misremember, or they 
may, in almost good faith, reconstruct their past to make it look the 
way they would have wanted it to happen. I cannot be sure. But as 
far as I can tell, I have encountered many omissions and evasions in 
the course of my project but very few lies. The most frequent fib 
seems to be the assurance that my conversation partner had never 
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been a member of the Party. But those Eire silly lies, easy to check, 
that usually collapse soon after being offered and that, moreover, are 
of no interest to me because under Socialism, the Party, like the 
Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, was almost the only place where 
people of intelligence and drive could achieve something. Like the 
medieval Church, the Party thus housed liberals and conservatives, 
reformers and reactionaries, good people and bad, and I assume that 
even those who were not Party members, if they held any status in 
this state at all, in one way or the other must have cooperated with 
the Party. I never ask my witnesses about their Party membership. 
The lie "I was not a member of the Party" is always volunteered. 
In fact, I try not to ask any questions that might tempt the an- 
swerer to lie, such as questions about guilt or innocence. Once a lie is 
spoken, it pollutes the conversation, like an unpleasant smell, and it 
is difficult for both participants to return from the deceit to a relaxed 
and open give and take. Much better to talk about factual issues 
such as work loads, ambitions, colleagues, pleasant and unpleasant 
tasks - the thousand details of an ordinary workday that grounded 
my conversation partners in the world that I investigate. 
But if blatant dishonesty is not a problem for my project, the sub- 
tle treachery of memory is. By the time I talk to them, most people's 
recollections, like a ray of light, have several times been broken in the 
prism of political events. My conversation partner, looking back upon 
his socialist past, will want to describe his former self as someone 
worthy of respect. He will want to see his present self as someone 
who deserves acceptance by the new society. And he will want to 
please me, the interviewer, by his answers. This is one reason, I be- 
lieve, why my witnesses occasionally lie about their former Party 
membership. Anticipating a Westerner's ignorance about what it 
meant to be a member and her contempt for all things socialist, the 
witness' statement "I was not a member ..." becomes an awkward 
and untruthful shorthand for the legitimate claim: "You should not 
write me off." In a way, Party membership has become an issue of 
conflicting German memories. The Eastern speaker remembers him- 
self as an honorable man. But if he admits to his former Party sta- 
tus, he fears that he will not be believed by his Western listener. 
Hence the lie: to establish the self-perceived truth of his moral 
worth. 
In this and many other situations, my respondents' memories 
may filter out those facts that are at odds with their desired self-rep- 
resentations. I, on the other hand, have seen the files. Within their 
limits, I will know more precisely what went on in a particular case 
than those who years ago were present when it happened. My con- 
versations with Frau Rüter offer many examples of memory corrected 
and embellished over time. Take the court's practice, in the early 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 09 Jun 2015 17:25:31 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2002] JUSTICE IN LÜRITZ 833 
1960s, of discussing pending divorce suits with the members of the 
parties' work collectives. Frau Riiter remembers those occasions as 
tactful, pastoral encounters between the couple and a few trusted no- 
tables (the judge, the Party Secretary of the enterprise or collective 
farm, maybe a teacher or a union representative) trying to talk sense 
into a troubled and unhappy couple. But I know from the records 
that, at times, 50 or 60 neighbors and colleagues of the parties would 
be present, debating the spouses' failings in a local assembly hall, 
and that on at least one occasion the audience voted to evict the hus- 
band's new girlfriend from collective housing to make her move away 
and so to save the marriage. Frau Rüter, to this day, remembers the 
large bunch of flowers that a grateful couple sent her after a success- 
ful reconciliation. I know from the divorce files that the reconcilia- 
tion was short-lived. 
My witnesses also may "remember" things that did not happen. I 
ask Frau Rüter about some criminal case that she decided many 
years ago. Frau Rüter knows by now that, in my view, East German 
sentences were often very harsh. "I did come down hard on him, 
didn't I," she says. As a matter of fact, she did not. But she expects 
me to believe so, and her current expectations have pushed aside 
whatever recollections she might have of "harsh" or "mild" Liiritz 
penalties in the 1960s. My files will answer questions about factual 
matters long since past far more reliably than my conversation part- 
ners can today. 
To my surprise, people may misremember not only failures and 
embarrassments but also acts of courage. Here is, again, a case de- 
cided by Frau Rüter. In 1958, she gave a suspended sentence to a 
young man accused of "resisting state authority."11 He had gotten 
into a fight with the police. The GDR Supreme Court vacated the 
decision and returned the case to Lüritz with the instruction that a 
crime against the state that involved physical insurrection deserved 
a non-suspended sentence of some severity.12 Meanwhile, the cul- 
prit, still at large when the Supreme Court heard his case, had the 
good sense to use his presence at the hearing in Berlin - these were 
pre-Wall days - to take the underground to West Berlin. 
Frau Rüter, upon receipt of her instructions, adjourned the case. 
East German rules of procedure would have allowed a trial in absen- 
tia.13 But she informed the Supreme Court that the defendant's pres- 
ence at his trial was essential. As both the Lüritz court and the 
prosecution knew, at his arrest he had been badly beaten up by the 
11. § 113 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code) of May 15, 1871 as amended by Gesetz 
zur Ergänzung des Strafgesetzbuches (Law Amending the Criminal Code) of Decem- 
ber 11, 1957, GBl. I at 643. 
12. Supreme Court of the GDR, decision of June 3, 1958, 4 Entscheidungen des 
Obersten Gerichts in Strafsachen 155 (1960). 
13. StPO supra n. 8 §§ 262-269. 
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police. The court could not clear up this facet of the case without his 
testimony. Since he had fled, she could only adjourn the trial until 
his unlikely return. 
More than a generation later, I read this small-town people's 
judge's letter to the highest court in the land and wonder. Frau 
Rüter had in fact been criticized for what the Supreme Court also 
could have called bourgeois lenience. Now this response, charging, in 
turn, socialist police brutality. How did the Supreme Court take her 
answer? I ask Frau Rüter about the incident. She cannot remember. 
I finally show her a copy of the long-forgotten letter. "Oh, yes," she 
now says. "I got into a lot of trouble about this case." Why? Because 
in her correspondence with the Supreme Court she had referred to 
the police unit involved with the colloquial term "mugging com- 
mando" ( Überfall-Kommando ). The correct term should have been 
"rapid response squad ( Einsatzkommando )." 
I cannot believe that, in 1958, Frau Rüter's superiors found no 
more wrong with her bout of independence than her choice of words. 
These were more than ordinarily repressive days in the GDR. Yet 
this is how Frau Rüter's memory has preserved the incident. Maybe 
this third-generation communist simply refused to register accusa- 
tions of bourgeois consciousness. Maybe Frau Rüter needed to forget 
the slight in order to maintain her lifelong faith in Socialism and its 
administration of justice. My lesson learned from this and many 
other conversations is that I cannot use my interviews as proof of 
indisputable facts and events. Some eyewitness reports may be 
"true" in the sense that they correctly describe what happened. Some 
may not. But they are always "true" to the state of mind of the re- 
porter. The most important function of my interviews is that they 
allow me to understand events not from my own, often foreign and 
ignorant, perspective, but from the viewpoint of someone who exper- 
ienced what she talks about firsthand. My interviews enable me to 
switch places and to put myself into another person's mind. 
Here is an example. A Lüritz lawyer tells me of a case from the 
early 1980s in which his fifteen year old client received a nine month 
prison sentence for attempted Republikflucht ("flight from the Repub- 
lic")14. All she had done was skip school, hitchhike to East Berlin, 
strike up a conversation with some Western students visiting the 
Eastern sector of the city, and ask them to mail a postcard to her 
mother from the West: "Hi Mom. Greetings from West Berlin." 
Before the postcard even had arrived in Lüritz, the girl had called her 
mother and had told her not to worry. But meanwhile, the Secret 
Police had gotten hold of the suspicious message, had visited the 
mother, and had made her drive with two Stasi agents to East Berlin 
to identify her child at a pre-arranged meeting place. At the rendez- 
14. StGB/GDR), supra n. 8 § 213. 
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vous, the mother had walked up to her daughter and had greeted her 
with a Judas kiss. 
This is the frightening story. But as I talk to the girl, now a 
young woman, about her ordeal I learn to my surprise that she is not 
angry at her mother. She does not feel betrayed. As she tells her 
story, the mother did not act like someone who entrapped her daugh- 
ter, but on the contrary, like someone who supported her through this 
and other troubles up to this day. The mother would have preferred 
not to cooperate with the Stasi. But she wanted her daughter, then a 
difficult and rebellious child, out of harm's way, and even flirting 
with escaping to the West was dangerous. I have found a few denun- 
ciations in my files: most of them by parents who reported their chil- 
dren to the police either for planning to flee the Republic or for 
refusing to do what was considered honest work. In both types of 
cases, the informers' children - teenagers or young adults - pre- 
dictably wound up in prison. But prison, to these parents, seemed to 
have appeared a safer place than the minefields one would have to 
cross to scale the Wall or even than the corruptive company of drunk- 
ards and good-for-nothings. 
In a parental legal system, the Super-parent State could appear 
as a natural ally to a mother or father who could no longer control 
and protect a wayward child. I realize that my horror at the young 
woman's story was too simple. Neither the socialist state nor the par- 
ent in these stories knew how to handle a dependant's insurrection. 
But the mother's kiss was not a Judas kiss. Try, for an experiment, 
to mentally transpose her behavior into Nazi Germany. No loving 
Jewish mother could possibly denounce her daughter, for her child's 
own sake, to the Gestapo. But in the GDR, the state was both feared 
and trusted. After her time in prison, my conversation partner re- 
turned to a narrow world of work, housing, healthcare, safety and 
predictability. Her report helped to let me understand this world a 
little better. Every one of my interviews does. Without them the 
facts learned only from the Lüritz records would seem like a movie 
without sound: an often baffling and disjointed story. 
IV. Findings 
In this essay, I can give only a rough prospective of my findings; 
a timeline, not much more, of legal developments in Lüritz from the 
beginning to the end of the GDR and a quick sketch of Lüritz citizens' 
relationship with the law. 
1. Confusion 
On April 14, 1945, the city suffered its last air-raid of the war. 
Three weeks later came Germany's unconditional surrender. It took 
a while for the Allied Forces to agree on the border between the So- 
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viet and the Western occupation zones,15 but by July 1945, Liiritz 
was definitely located in the Soviet Zone. A photograph in the town's 
museum from this time shows a little girl, handing a big bunch of 
flowers to a smiling Soviet soldier. But real life in Liiritz must have 
been frightening and chaotic. The city was swamped with refugees 
from the Eastern parts of Germany, looking for rest and shelter on 
their trek to the West. Townspeople who could manage joined their 
flight to the Western zones. Locals and refugees vied for scarce food 
and housing. The overcrowding brought typhoid in its wake. The 
Russians, undisciplined and unpredictable, were in control. It is hard 
to see how law in those years could have had anything to offer to 
Lüritz's battered citizens. 
What law? What courts? Two months after the capitulation, on 
July 9, 1945, the Allied Control Council had ordered the restoration 
of Germany's traditional court system.16 But on September 4, 1945, 
the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) decreed that, in the So- 
viet Occupation Zone, all former members of the Nazi party were to 
be dismissed from the administration of justice.17 Since already by 
1935, 80% of all German judges had been members of the NSDAP,18 
the Soviet de-nazification program amounted to an almost total turn- 
over of judicial staff. In fact, the purge could serve a double purpose: 
to cleanse a judiciary deeply tainted by the Nazi years, and to replace 
supposedly "a-political" bourgeois professionals by class-conscious 
and politically committed judges from the people.19 Until those new 
judges could be found and trained, some temporary personnel was 
needed for the courts to function. A few sitting judges who had not 
been members of the Nazi party were allowed to carry on. Clean- 
vested bourgeois pensioners with legal training were resurrected 
from retirement. Where to find the rest? 
On December 17, 1945, the Soviet Military Administration or- 
dered the introduction of legal training courses for "people's 
judges."20 The new East German government and Party authorities 
eagerly carried out the plans. The recruits, ordinary men and women 
of preferably proletarian background, were taught the rudiments of 
German law together with growing doses of socialist ideology, in 
crash courses that lasted six months at the beginning of the program 
15. See Daniel Holtrop, "Schwerin as Case Study of the Anglo-American a d Rus- 
sian Occupations in Mecklenburg," unpublished paper delivered at the German Stud- 
ies Association's Conference, Oct. 8-11, 1998, in Salt Lake City (on file with the 
author). 
16. Ruth-Kristin Rössler, Justizpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945 -1956 (Frankfurt 
am Main 2000) at 22. 
17. Rössler, loc. cit at 22. 
18. Rössler, loc. cit. at 14. 
19. On the de-professionalization of the East German judiciary see Hilde Benja- 
min, (ed.(, Zur Geschichte der Rechtspflege d r DDR 1945-1949 p. 91 (Berlin 1976). 
20. Benjamin, loc.cit. at 94. 
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and that eventually were lengthened to one, and finally, two, years.21 
Many of the new law students found it difficult to handle the sylla- 
bus. Like the Western occupation zones, the Soviet zone still was 
largely governed by the law of pre-war Germany, amended by decrees 
of the Soviet Military Administration, but dominated, nonetheless, by 
the great German codes of the turn of the century and their elaborate 
doctrinal apparatuses. The bourgeois law's most famous prototype, 
the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code or BGB) of 1900, remained in 
force in the GDR until as late as 1975.22 To join a training course for 
"people's judges," an applicant needed, besides what counted for good 
political character, no more than a completed grade school educa- 
tion.23 No wonder that many of the candidates, unused to formal 
schooling and to deskwork, could not stay the course.24 And many of 
those who passed, would have to struggle all their working lives with 
the doctrinal subtleties of the civil law. Judge Rüter, originally a 
cigarmaker by training, who entered the last, by now two year train- 
ing course from 1951 to 1953, still speaks with gratitude of the few 
holdover bourgeois jurists on the Lüritz bench who helped her out if 
some intricacy of the BGB defied her. By I960, all "people's judges" 
had to pass a two-year correspondence course with the country's new 
Academy for State and Law to retain their posts25 and by then, the 
differences between the populist old guard and the new, academically 
trained judiciary began to blur and disappear. But justice in East 
Germany's early post-war years was colored by the strengths and 
weaknesses of the hodge-podge and populist "people's" judiciary. 
The earliest case file in my Lüritz archive concerns a suit over 
the purchase of a horse, filed on January 26, 1946. By then, the court 
- as in the past still called an Amtsgericht - cannot have been in 
operation for more than a few weeks. Astonishingly, Lüritz citizens 
flock to the court as soon as its doors are opened. In 1946, about 350 
civil cases are filed; in 1947, about 500; and in 1950, 788 civil suits 
are litigated in the Lüritz Amtsgericht, most of them between private 
parties. Despite the surrounding political chaos, Lüritz citizens vig- 
orously pursue their legal rights. 
Or maybe because of it. The issues in controversy reflect the 
neediness and deprivation of the times. There are many lawsuits 
over bicycles (the only means of transportation) and sewing machines 
21. On the training of "people's judges" see Andrea Feth, Hilde Benjamin - Eine 
Biographie (Berlin 1997) at 60; Pfannkuch. supra n. 4. 
22. It was replaced by the Zivilgesetzbuch (Civil Code; henceforth ZGB) of June 
19, 1975, GBl. I p. 465 (1975). 
23. Pfannkuch, supra n. 4, at 26. 
24. Of 171 participants of the first course for "people s judges , 57% passed the 
final exams in the Fall of 1946. One year later, of 253 participants, 51% passed the 
second course. See Benjamin, supra n. 19, at 106. 
25. Hilde Benjamin, (ed.), Zur Geschichte der Rechtspflege d r DDR 1949-1961 p. 
160 (Berlin 1980). 
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(the only means to clothe your family). Brothers sue sisters over a 
pair of used boots or a loan of sheets and blankets. In 1946, 50% of 
the suits do not ask for money but for the return of objects, much 
more valuable than paper money that cannot buy what you need to 
survive such as potatoes, grain, firewood, and, in this agrarian econ- 
omy, livestock from cattle down to chickens. Both refugees and locals 
use the law to hold onto the few possessions they have left. "I have 
lost everything," a refugee from East Prussia writes in his brief. "Af- 
ter repeated requisitions (by the occupation powers) I have nothing 
left," writes a local farmer. Legal battles are fought tenaciously: in 
1946, 43% of the parties have a lawyer (by 1950, that number has 
fallen to 27%) and almost half of the cases end in judgments (by 1979, 
this percentage is 19%). Reading these files, one gets the impression 
of a world that is out of joint but whose inhabitants still cling to the 
values of their previous life: authority, rank, class, property, the 
keeping of promises. They expect the law to back up their traditional 
beliefs. In the early files, male litigants are identified by their station 
in life: "the metal worker Schmidt," "the pharmacist Schulze." Wo- 
men are defined in relation to men: "the baker's widow Meyer," "the 
doctor's daughter Müller." The court's gauge of propriety is 
" ein an- 
ständiger Mensch 
" (a decent and decorous burgher). 
In my civil files, the political terrors of the time appear primarily 
as echoes and reflections from a menacing outside world that private 
people try to avoid as best they can. Since the criminal law files in 
the Lüritz archives go back no earlier than to 1952, 1 have no immedi- 
ate records of the violence caused by political collapse and hunger in 
the first years of Soviet occupation. The Soviet Army could not be 
sued and thus played no participating role in civil casefiles. Their 
criminal transgressions, like the wave of Soviet rapes in 1945 and 
1946, 26 are never mentioned. But like Banquo's ghost, the memory of 
war and the reality of Soviet occupation are always present. Ad- 
dresses reveal how refugees and local parties frequently have to 
double-up in overcrowded housing. Men are surprisingly often re- 
ferred to as "in prison." "They took my husband in December 1945," a 
woman testifies. "My husband is a prisoner of war and will soon re- 
turn," another woman plaintiff hopefully explains. Although the So- 
viet Army cannot be the object of civil litigation, it is often the cause 
of it. Who owns a cow that Soviet soldiers have taken from one man's 
farm and given to another? What about debts owed by an enterprise 
that is now in Soviet hands? In the Lüritz briefs, the occupation 
forces are always called " der Russe " (the Russian), always in the sin- 
gular, and I envision the soldier in that photograph in the town's mu- 
seum, with the same Cossack boots and belted uniform, though 
26. See Normern M. Nairn ark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet 
Zone of Occupation, 1945 - 1949 at 69 (Cambridge, Mass. 1995). 
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without the smile. "The Russian" giveth and "the Russian" taketh 
away. When he is done, the Lüritz judges have to sort out the legal 
consequences of his acts. 
In the very first year or two after the war, several of those judges 
in Lüritz seem to have been university-trained lawyers recalled from 
retirement. The most permanent of them, Judge Wapnewski, is 68 
years old when the court is opened and stays on the bench until 1952. 
To judge by their spindly, gothic handwriting, his two law-trained 
colleagues are even older. They do not stay long. A paralegal, acting 
as judge pro-tern in 1946, returns two years later as a "people's judge" 
- it is Herr Schmalz, the court's ideologue, who is the first graduate 
of the new training courses to be appointed to the bench in Lüritz. 
Two young men who were in the midst of their judicial internships 
when Germany collapsed, for a while with uncertain legitimation are 
employed as 
" 
ex-officio 
" 
judges and then disappear as well. Most of 
these people probably go West. I meet one of them years later when 
he writes from the Federal Republic to ask the court for some docu- 
ments concerning his retirement pay. Since he had left the country 
illegally, he gets no reply. Not only judges disappear in these years: 
trials are adjourned because an attorney has gone West; work piles 
up in the court's offices because secretaries leave overnight. Every- 
thing is temporary and make-shift: the personnel, the law, the meth- 
ods of reasoning by which the court arrives at its decisions. 
The very early files give the impression that the law is on the 
brink of moving in a new direction but that nobody can tell yet what 
it is. Uncertainty and contradictions reign not just in Lüritz. In Au- 
gust 1947, the Communist Party, in the regional capital, organizes a 
demonstration of more than 1,000 people to protest against "too leni- 
ent" sentences for black-marketeers - clearly an event scheduled to 
send a warning to the courts. But six months later, newspapers re- 
port the first session of the province's new administrative court, also 
in the capital, and its verdict in favor of a private craftsman who had 
sued the state over a license. The administrative court, the very em- 
bodiment of liberal notions of the rule of law, would not live long.27 
In Lüritz, a disparate and transient group of judges tries to adjust old 
bourgeois law to new, unfamiliar circumstances. 
27. The establishment of administrative courts in all of Germany was ordered by 
the Allied Control Council in October 1946, an order reluctantly reiterated by the 
Soviet Military Administration for the Soviet Occupation Zone on July 8, 1947. Be- 
tween 1946 and 1948, several East German states passed legislation creating new 
administrative courts. Although the first East German Constitution of 1949, in its 
Art. 138, reaffirmed the GDR's commitment toestablish administrative courts by fed- 
eral legislation, that legislation was never passed, and the existing state administra- 
tive courts were silently abolished when, in 1952, the federal organization of the GDR 
war replaced by a highly centralized state structure. See Heike Amos, Justizverwal- 
tung in der SBZ/DDR (Köln 1996) at 188; Janke, "die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in 
der SBZ und in der DDR," 46 Neue Justiz 425 (1992). 
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It takes the court less than a year to acknowledge that the Soviet 
occupation forces, like a deus ex machina, just by their actions can 
create new rights. In March 1947, the court awards to its original 
owner a cow that had been seized by Soviet soldiers and later was 
found astray by another farmer who then claimed to have obtained it 
in good faith. Relying on § 935 BGB, the court rules that an object 
lost against the will of its owner cannot be the subject of a good faith 
acquisition. But five months later, this time in a suit over an ab- 
ducted horse, the court has changed its mind: any kind of Soviet req- 
uisition, whether ordered from above or carried out by marauding 
soldiers, extinguishes the original owner's rights and allows the de 
novo acquisition of an object by another. Judge Wapnewski writes: 
"Section 935 BGB is a principle geared to peace-times. It does not 
apply to war and post-war conditions." The original owner of the 
horse appeals with a plea for traditional justice: "Right must stay 
right, and wrong must remain wrong, even in times such as ours. 
Indeed, one might claim that the current times require particular at- 
tention to legal rules." As befits the confusion of the times, the Court 
of Appeals arranges a settlement that mixes conflicting values with 
the pragmatism of scarcity: the defendant may keep the horse but 
has to return to the original owner-plaintiff the first foal that the dis- 
puted mare will give birth to. 
Legal values in Lüritz seem equally ambiguous with judges bow- 
ing both in the direction of the old and the new. One case file might 
contain precise citations to the BGB, the next decision may be 
grounded on only the vaguest reference to un-cited orders of the So- 
viet occupation forces. Judge Wapnewski switches back and forth be- 
tween old Nazi vocabulary (" gesundes Volksempfinden 
" - healthy 
judgment of the folk), socialist newspeak ("the new convictions of the 
times") and plain good sense ("No reasonable person would pour valu- 
able sugar into the plaintiffs gas tank just to damage his engine"). 
His views on the role of women in society are those of an unrecon- 
structed 70 year old patriarch, but the views of his socialist colleague, 
the new "people's judge" Herr Schmalz, are no better. 
But there is one important continuity in this clash of worlds and 
values. I was alerted to it by the suit of a woman, filed in August 
1946, who went to court against the Lüritz bank to regain control 
over her bank account which had been frozen by the Soviet occupa- 
tion forces because of its owner's alleged Nazi past. In her brief, the 
plaintiff claims mistaken identity: not she but her sister had been the 
Nazi bigshot. "It is not right that I should lose all my money because 
of the Party," the plaintiff wrote. For a moment, I was puzzled as I 
read this sentence. Should the Communist Party, at this early date, 
have actively intervened in the case? But then I realized: it was not 
the Communist Party that the writer had referred to. She meant the 
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other one: the NSDAP. The plaintiffs choice of words - just 
"Party," as if no further adjective was needed to describe so powerful 
and indisputable an entity - made me understand how seamlessly 
Lüritz citizens had moved from one Party to the next, from one condi- 
tion of dependence to the other. No breathing space between totali- 
tarian rule and totalitarian rule allowed them to develop the habits of 
autonomy on which the rule of law must rest. The two dictatorships 
were very different, and East German Socialism would leave far more 
room for Lüritz citizens to assert their human worth than the Nazi 
regime. But the continuity of the individual's subjugation to the 
state would shape East German law until the end of the GDR. 
2. Beginnings 
By the early 1950s, the new direction of East Germany and its 
legal system could no longer be in doubt. On October 7, 1949, the 
German Democratic Republic had been founded, five months after 
the West German Federal Republic. In 1952, together with the aboli- 
tion of the country's federal structure, came the replacement of the 
traditional German combination of state and federal courts by a 
highly centralized three-tiered court structure; the Lüritz 
Amtsgericht was now a Kreisgericht .28 In July 1952, East Germany's 
communist party, the SED29, announced "the construction of Social- 
ism" in the GDR.30 By then, the first East German Five-Year Plan 
was in its second year, the collectivization of agriculture had begun, 
and law, particularly criminal law, had become a significant instru- 
ment to carry out the State's commitment to radical political and so- 
cial change. 1952 also marks the retirement of Judge Wapnewski, 
now aged 74, from the Lüritz bench; he becomes an attorney in town. 
By now, there are four new "people's judges" at the Kreisgericht; by 
1953, two more - Frau Rüter and Frau Haas - would join the court. 
Not all are present all the time: two of the Lüritz "people's judges," 
old communists, still suffer from the after-effects of their imprison- 
ment under Hitler and, because of their poor health, often miss work; 
two others, in 1954, are diagnosed with ТВ and for months disappear 
from the files as well. The court can not yet do without some tempo- 
rary help and, of the various signatures I find in the records, at least 
some belong to bourgeois stand-ins, temporarily recruited from Lord 
knows where. Frau Rüter remembers one of them, Herr Lübtow, 
28. Verordnung über die Neugliederung der Gerichte (Decree on the Reorganiza- 
tion of the Court Structure) of August 28, 1952, GBl. 791 (1952). 
29. SED stands for Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany), reflecting the 1946 unification, under considerable political pres- 
sure, of East Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) with the more powerful and 
overbearing Communist Party (KPD). See Hermann Weber, Die DDR 1945 - 1990 
(München 1993) at 14, 165. 
30. Weber, id. at 34. 
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"one of the old guard," because of his helpfulness and his "beautifully 
manicured hands." As in other revolutionary times, smooth hands, 
for the cigar-maker, identify the member of the former ruling class. 
To Frau Rüter, Herr Lübtow is a valued colleague, but he clearly is 
also a relic of the past. The new Lüritz judiciary is proletarian (in 
outlook, if not necessarily in origin), consciously political, activist, 
ready to do its share in the creation of a new society. 
Unlike in previous times, when the court waited for its clients to 
apply for help, it now goes out and searches for things to do. Frau 
Rüter and her colleagues define themselves as educators and mis- 
sionaries of Socialism. Each week, judges and paralegals make the 
rounds in villages and collective farms near Lüritz to provide legal 
advice to citizens who might find it difficult to get to town. The chron- 
icles of these visits - modest notebooks bound in black wax-cloth - 
register the legal problems of a battered and impoverished popula- 
tion trying to make due and record the advice of "barefoot judges" 
who pay more attention to practical than to legal issues. Lüritz 
judges arrange collective meetings on divorce suits to persuade their 
audiences that broken marriages are not private affairs but affect the 
welfare and productivity of the community. They speak at enter- 
prises and at village halls, admonishing husbands to help their wives 
with household chores, encouraging wives to take up a job, and lec- 
turing suspicious parents on the ill effects of physical punishment on 
children. In 1958, the Lüritz court and prosecutor's office hold 20 
public meetings at various enterprises to discuss recent criminal 
sentences that "exemplify the new role of state and law" - whether 
to instruct or to scare the audience is not reported in my files. A total 
of 2,420 workers attend. 
The language of judgments in these years is openly political. Ali- 
mony and support claims of ex-wives and children who defected to 
the Federal Republic are routinely rejected by the court because East 
German money "shall not be used to support West Germany's aggres- 
sive NATO policy" or because a child "has been removed from the 
educational influence of our workers-and-peasants state." In 1952, a 
man who, in violation of export restrictions, tries to sell 13 kilograms 
of lead in West Berlin receives a 5-year prison sentence with hard 
labor because "we cannot tolerate that metals needed for the peaceful 
reconstruction of the GDR are used for purposes of re-armament in 
West Germany." East German criminal law and policy in these years 
are obsessed with crimes against the economy (such as theft or em- 
bezzlement of state property, the violation of procurement targets, or 
the concealment of assets to prevent their requisition)31 and with any 
31. In the late 1940s and the 1950s, a series of extraordinarily harsh decrees pro- 
tecting state economic planning and state property penalized even minor economic 
transgressions with long prison sentences. See in particular Wirtschaftsstrafver- 
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behavior challenging state authority: "rebellion" ( Aufruhr ), "resis- 
tance" ( Widerstand ), "illegal possession of firearms" (mostly of left- 
over weapons and ammunition from the War), and "the incitement to 
boycott" (a new crime, tenuously and without any legal qualms based 
on a seemingly throwaway sentence of the new East German consti- 
tution from 194932), which under Lüritz case-law can mean anything 
from the distribution of Western literature to an attack on a police- 
man. In 1953, of a batch of 67 arrest warrants found in the Lüritz 
archives, 73% deal with offenses against the state or the economy. 
Two years later, of an incomplete sample of 81 arrest warrants, al- 
most one fifth is for men (almost always drunk at the time) who got 
into a fight with the police. Reading these files, one gets the impres- 
sion of a highly charged political atmosphere in which an authorita- 
rian and messianic state confronts a worn-out and resentful 
population. 
The Lüritz court seems to operate in a world of friend against foe, 
new against old, right against wrong, with "right" not defined in 
moral terms but in terms of historical correctness. In criminal cases, 
defendants are identified by cues that help the court to place them in 
Ordnung (Decree on Economic Crimes) of Sept. 23, 1948, ZVOBl. p. 439 (1948); Ver- 
ordnung über die Bestrafung von Spekulationsverbrechen (Decree on the Punishment 
of Speculation) of June 22, 1949, ZVOBl. p. 471 (1949); Gesetz zum Schutze des in- 
nerdeutschen Handels (Statute on the Protection of Inner-German Trade) of April 21, 
1950, GBl. p. 327 (1950), and Gesetz zum Schutze des Volkseigentums (Statute on the 
Protection of People's Property) of Oct. 2, 1952, GBl. p. 982. A year after the passage 
of the Statute on the Protection of People's Property, a GDR Supreme Court Guideline 
considerably softened the harshness of East Germany's law on economic rimes by 
restricting its application to "severe attacks" on state property; see Richtlinie Nr. 3 
des Obersten Gerichts of Oct. 28, 1953, ZB1. p. 543. Former Minister of Justice Hilde 
Benjamin in 1980 admitted that the ruthless application of East Germany's early law 
on economic rimes had led to "difficulties" which taught "a serious lesson" to East 
German criminal policy. See Benjamin, supra n. 25, at 314 (1980). 
32. Prior to the foundation of the GDR in 1949, crimes uch as "sabotage" or "sub- 
version" were punished under Decree No. 160 of the Soviet Military Administration, 
which provided for severe penalties, including the death penalty, for attacks on the 
new state order; see Benjamin, supra n. 19, at 243. After the creation of the GDR, the 
GDR Supreme Court, in the 1950s, produced a large body of case law punishing a 
variety of attacks on the new "antifascist-democratic order" from "sabotage" and "espi- 
onage" to the spreading of political jokes directly under Art. 6 Para. II of the new East 
German Constitution which condemned the "incitement toboycott" as a "felony;" see 
Benjamin, supra n. 25, at 291. In 1958, the amorphous criminal case law under Art. 6 
Para. II of the Constitution was dispensed with when an amendment to the Criminal 
Code introduced a list of still very ambiguously defined crimes against the state; see 
Strafrechtsergänzungsgesetz (LawAmending the Criminal Code) of Dec. 11, 1957, 
GBl. I p. 643 (1957). In 1968, the Strafrechtsergänzungsgesetz was replaced by the 
new East German Criminal Code, which distinguished between "felonies directed 
against the GDR" (chapter 2), punished with mandatory and often lengthy prison 
sentences and the less serious "crimes against the state order" (chapter 8) such as 
"resistance to state authority" (§212) or "illegally passing the state border" (§213), 
which gave room to a much wider spectrum of penalties, including conditional 
sentences. The death penalty, originally an option for several "felonies directed 
against the GDR" under the 1968 Criminal Code, was abolished in 1987 by a Decree 
of the Council of State (GBl. I p. 192). 
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the camp of progress or reaction: someone is a reliable worker (good); 
police have found "American gangster novels" in his possession (bad); 
a defendant has spent her last vacations in West Germany - these 
are pre-Wall days (bad, or at least suspicious). "Bei uns" ("with us") 
is one of the court's most frequently used expressions. It reflects the 
feelings of endangerment and isolation of a new creed whose mem- 
bers have to stand together to defend a cause. "In our GDR we can- 
not tolerate. . .," the court might write, or "we in the GDR insist 
that. . . ." Those who do not join ranks with the forces of progress 
have no legitimate place in this society. That applies particularly to 
people who refuse to work: the "a-socials" or Assis who even before 
"parasitism" becomes a crime in the GDR33 are punished under rules 
of the old German criminal code that judges in the early Nazi years 
had also used, in a similar spirit of "we" against "them," to penalize 
those who did not fit in.34 "We in the GDR have no use for people of 
this type," the court writes in a sentence for vagrancy in 1952. And in 
1958, in a decision in which someone is punished with 6 weeks in 
prison for failing to register at his place of residence, Judge Schmalz 
explains: "Every citizen of our Republic must strictly observe the De- 
cree on Registration. It protects us against infiltration by dark 
elements." 
Complete commitment to a faith should not be limited to office 
hours. To demonstrate its close connection with the working class, 
the Lüritz judiciary in these years is expected to do its share of " 
körperliche Arbeit 
" 
(physical labor): the "people's judges" shall get 
callused hands by doing the people's work. Given the scarcity of labor 
power in the GDR, the help is needed. In 1958, the Lüritz court is 
praised for having overfulfilled its promise of 200 hours of production 
work by 396 hours and for having taken two acres of sugarbeets of a 
collective farm nearby "into personal care." In 1960, Judge Schmalz, 
always on the political cutting edge, accompanies the crew of a fish- 
ing trawler on one of its trips on the Baltic Sea. In the same fall, 
33. The first East German legislation criminalizing absenteeism and work eva- 
sion was introduced by the VO über Aufenthaltsbeschränkung (Decree on Restric- 
tions of the Right to Residence and Movement) of August 24, 1961, GB1.II 343. 
34. § 361 and §42d of the old German Criminal Code of 1871 (which largely re- 
mained in force in the GDR until 1968) punished offenses such as vagrancy, begging, 
prostitution, or the refusal to take up work with arrest lasting up to six weeks and 
confinement in "work-houses" for a period of up to two years. These provisions stayed 
on the books in West Germany until 1959. They were used both in the early Nazi 
years and in the first decade of the GDR to prosecute drunks, vagrants, and other 
social misfits. In Nazi Germany, the confinement ofAsoziale in "work houses" was 
increasingly replaced by their imprisonment in concentration camps. GDR law abol- 
ished the socialist equivalent of "work houses" (called "Arbeitserziehung" - education 
through work in special work-camps) in 1977; since then, "work-shy behavior" counts 
as a "crime against public order", with average penalties between one and two years 
in prison. See Ayaß, supra n. 10; Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, "Verschärfung der 
"Parasitenbekämpfung" in der DDR," 9 Deutschland-Archiv 834 (1976). 
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Frau Haas spends four - probably more useful - weeks harvesting 
potatoes. 
Despite these efforts, the East German administration of justice 
often finds fault with its "people's judges." They were too quickly and 
indiscriminately recruited, are too untrained and too unaccustomed 
to office work not to give their superiors constant cause for criticism. 
In Lüritz, as elsewhere, regular inspection groups from Berlin and 
from the regional capital check up on the daily operation of the 
courts. The reports of these inspections usually mix praise and 
blame. Frau Rüter, especially, is faulted for insufficient knowledge of 
the law, and in 1954, an inspector comes once a week to supervise her 
work. Judges are taken to task for too short judgments, for not keep- 
ing track of fees and expenses, for wasteful work organization, mud- 
dled filing schemes, incorrect spelling, and time and again, for a lack 
of Party spirit. In 1953, Lüritz judges are rebuked for wearing dark 
clothing on the bench - it is too bourgeois. In 1955, Judge Haas is 
faulted for too lenient sentences, Judge Riiter for too harsh ones. Ju- 
dicial policies are often shifting, and "people's judges" find it difficult 
to get things right. In 1958, Judge Haas is praised for her political 
enthusiasm, but of her colleagues, only a few are found to "truly think 
for themselves." The inspectors' report, sounding exasperated, 
speaks of "grossly indifferent political decisions" at the Lüritz 
Kreisgericht. 
The Lüritz judges react to these reproofs as conscientious stu- 
dents react to a bad grade: by trying to do better the next time. 
When in 1957 the court is faulted for too many acquittals, it does its 
best to mend its ways and, indeed, by the next year, Lüritz acquittal 
rates are down. But I do not have the impression that changes like 
these are the result, or (to be more cautious) only the result, of blind 
submission. Some of the Lüritz judges may simply do as they are 
told; Judge Wapnewski, for example, who in the first years on the 
court seemed to grope around for the right judicial style, looked like a 
man with deep-seated prejudices but without much of a moral rud- 
der. But the "people's judges" of the 1950s or at least those whom I 
know best - Frau Haas and Frau Rüter - seem different. They 
follow Party orders the way a religious person follows the advice of 
his priest: because they think that he is likely to be right. "I always 
imagined it like a pyramid," Frau Rüter once told me. "Those at the 
top could see much farther than I could." Her faith in the authority of 
the Party was a reflection of her faith in the Party's cause. Their 
belief in Socialism made many "people's judges" unthinkingly follow 
Party orders. But at the same time, it provided them with a 
stockfund of convictions on which to ground their work and thus gave 
them a moral honesty and, paradoxically, an occasional indepen- 
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dence, which many of the judges coming after them, in times far less 
obsessed with ideology, were lacking.35 
Their political faith allowed Judge Rüter and Judge Haas to see 
a rosy future where others could detect no more than a bleak present. 
"The plaintiff will achieve real happiness in life only by engaging in 
productive work that is suited to her abilities," Frau Haas writes in 
1951, rejecting the alimony claim of a divorced woman. As a widow 
who raises two children on her own, she clearly knows and believes 
what she says. Denying the rescission of a contract by which a 
farmer acquired someone's share in a collective farm, Frau Rüter 
writes in 1963: "The defendant should not allow himself to be unduly 
influenced by the current (highly unsatisfactory) conditions on the 
farm. He rather should actively engage in our program of completely 
restructuring our agriculture and thus soon become a beneficiary of 
everything that will be new in rural life." 
Political convictions also allow these judges to assert their views 
in ways that occasionally get them into trouble. Both Judge Haas 
and Judge Rüter have recurrent run-ins with the Lüritz police whom 
they accuse of sloppy investigations and, on occasion, of beatings of 
those detained. Frau Haas has a long-standing conflict with the 
Lüritz prosecutor's office, again, over the insufficient investigation of 
criminal charges. In 1958 she sentences a women accused of "defa- 
mation of the state" - the defendant had told jokes about First Party 
Secretary Ulbricht - to six months in prison rather than the nine 
months demanded by the prosecutor. Not good enough, you might 
well say. Yes, but at the trial, Judge Haas also, as evidence, blithely 
recites all the jokes, unedited, that the defendant had been guilty of. 
Ten years later, in similar cases, the penalty might not necessarily be 
higher but the jokes themselves would only be discretely alluded to 
and never, ever told. The "people's judges" in the 1950s retained a 
straightforwardness and human optimism that gave them their pecu- 
liar strength. Over the years, that optimism gradually disappeared 
from Lüritz caselaw. In 1952, Lüritz judges deviated from the prose- 
cution's suggested penalty in 49% of all criminad cases, almost always 
in favor of the defendant. By 1959, that figure had shrunk to 15% 
and, by 1979, to 9%.36 
And while those in control often fault the Lüritz court for its ide- 
ological errors, the supervisors in these years also seem convinced 
35. For reminiscences by early "people's judges" published in the last year of So- 
cialism in the GDR, see "Erinnerungen a  die Rechtspflege zur Zeit der Gründung der 
DDR," 43 Neue Justiz 410 (1989). 
36. I have counted ònly major judicial deviations from the prosecutor's suggested 
penalties: suspended vs. non-suspended sentences, differences in the number of 
months a defendant would have to spend in prison under the prosecutor's and the 
judge's version of his sentence, and (extremely rare) acquittals. Differences between 
the prosecutor's and the court's approach to so-called "supplementary penalties" such 
as fines or residence restrictions are not included in my survey. 
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that political disagreement, while not desirable, is at least preferable 
to passive compliance. My Lüritz protagonists thus are criticized for 
being "inactive" and "unpolitical" and for failing to engage in 
"profound political discussions." For judges whose poor professional 
training made them particularly vulnerable to directions from above, 
the difference between thinking and unthinking obedience to the 
Party may not always have seemed worth the bother. Indeed, 
throughout the history of the GDR, inspectors and inspected usually 
found it easier to stick to the unreflective and safe rule of doing-as- 
told than to engage in political deliberations. But to my surprise, I 
also find that the judge whose work I respect most in these years - 
Frau Haas - is also the favorite of the revisore from Berlin and, as it 
seems, for reasons similar to mine: because of the carefulness of her 
decisions, their common sense, and the fact that their political fervor 
does not dull their author's individual self-confidence and human em- 
pathy. One of my most enlightening finds in the Lüritz archive are 
two letters from the Ministry of Justice to the Lüritz court - one 
from 1969, the other from 1988 - in which the Ministry outlines, for 
recruitment purposes, the most essential attributes for judges in the 
GDR. The 1969 guidelines name a host of qualities that would make 
their bearer an engaged and useful representative of a parental legal 
system - industry, drive, independence, decisiveness, good people 
skills - with "ideological position" just one of many other desirables 
on the long list. The 1988 directives, composed at a time when belief 
in Socialism was at an all-time low in the GDR, state as the very first 
criteria for the evaluation of socialist judges their "attitude towards 
the SED" and their "willingness to carry out Party resolutions." The 
differences between the two catalogues suggest a correlation between 
political faith and intellectual freedom that affected not only the judi- 
ciary in the GDR. A leadership that is convinced of its own goals and 
of the commitment of its followers can be more tolerant of disagree- 
ment than a leadership that no longer believes in its own sermons. 
Hence the much wider margin of permissible debate in these early 
years than in later, seemingly less ideologically intense and more set- 
tled, times. 
Meanwhile, civil litigation rates in Lüritz are sinking. Whatever 
the boundaries of political discourse, Lüritz citizens seem to lose in- 
terest in the law at a rapid pace. In 1950, 788 civil plaintiffs had 
brought suit at the old Amtsgericht. By 1953, the new Kreisgericht 
registers only 328 civil plaintiffs, and by 1963, that number has gone 
down to 90. What has happened? 
In part, the fall in civil litigation can be explained by changes in 
East German law. In 1951, with the introduction of special economic 
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courts,37 all litigation between state-owned enterprises was removed 
from the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and in 1956, a new statute on 
domestic disputes transferred alimony and support claims from the 
civil law to the family law statistics.38 But even if we subtract from 
the 788 civil claims filed in 1950 all economic and domestic mainte- 
nance disputes, we are left with more than 500 disputes between citi- 
zens that even under the new rules would have been adjudicated by 
the Lüritz Kreisgericht. That is more than five times the court's civil 
caseload of 1963. 39 Why does civil litigation under Socialism seem so 
much less attractive to the citizens of Lüritz than litigation in the 
unsettled and impoverished immediate post-war years? 
I do not think that it was fear of socialist authorities that kept 
prospective Lüritz plaintiffs out of court. Those cases that are 
brought do not smell of political subservience. It is rather that the 
law's usefulness to individuals seems to be shrinking in a society in 
which production is determined by the Plan, wages and prices are set 
by the state, tenants can only rarely be evicted, employees for all in- 
tents and purposes cannot be fired, and money is not worth very 
much. People sue to enhance their choices and to enlarge their el- 
bow-room. But with every advance of Socialism in the GDR, the citi- 
zens of Lüritz lose room to maneuver. And so, together with their 
shrinking territory, the usefulness of law that could have helped its 
subjects to explore and defend that territory, shrinks as well. 
3. Consolidation 
In November 1965, the first professional jurist becomes director 
of the Lüritz Kreisgericht. It is Herr Krahl, a difficult and brooding 
man, quite different, it seems to me, from the activist and forward- 
looking "people's judges" who preceded him. For another decade or 
so, old and new judges serve together on the Lüritz bench, but the 
populist old guard steadily loses influence to the better educated re- 
cruits from East Germany's new socialist law faculties. By 1976, 
37. Verordnung über die Bildung und Tätigkeit des Staatlichen Vertraggerichts 
(Decree on the Establishment and the Tasks of the State Contract Court) of Dec. 6, 
1951, GBl. I p. 1143 (1951). 
38. Eheverfahrensverordnung (Decree on Marital Procedure) of Feb. 7, 1956, GBl. 
I p. 145 (1956). 
39. The 1963 introduction of Schiedskommissionen (Dispute Commissions) - lay 
courts taffed with local citizens that adjudicated simple civil law disputes (primarily 
between eighbors and co-tenants in apartment houses) - came too late to explain the 
rapid drop of civil litigation in the GDR, and affected it too little. In 1983, Dispute 
Commissions resolved 9.9% of all civil disputes in the GDR; with the rise of litigation 
in the 1980s, that percentage dropped to 7.2% in 1989. See Rechtspflege-Erlaß (De- 
cree on the Administration fJustice) of April 4, 1963, GBl. I p. 21; Schiedskommis- 
sions-Richtlinie (Guideline on Dispute Commissions) of Aug. 21, 1964, GBl. I p. 115; 
Krug, "Das zivilrechtliche Wirken der Schiedskommissionen - Konzept und 
Ergebnisse," in Rainer Schröder, (ed.), Zivilrechtskultur de DDR , vol. I at 245 (Berlin 
1999). 
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Frau Riiter is the only "people's judge" left on the Lüritz bench. She 
stays until her retirement in 1980, respected and like by all, but play- 
ing a bit the role of a kibbutznik in modern Israel: a representative of 
a heroic age that still provides the myths to which one can appeal on 
national holidays but whose daily struggles, thank God, have become 
a matter of the past. 
Frau Haas had left the Lüritz court already in February 1965. It 
would be more accurate to say that she had vanished. The files sug- 
gest that she became embroiled in one of her disagreements with the 
prosecutor's office; I find her sending back indictments for incomplete 
investigation and complaining in letters to the Regional Court of 
shoddy prosecutorial work. Then, suddenly, it is no longer Frau Haas 
but someone else who signs the weekly reports that the Lüritz Kreis- 
gericht (and every other trial court in the country) sends to its supe- 
rior court. Frau Haas' round and distinctive signature never shows 
up again. I ask Frau Rüter for an explanation. Yes, her colleague 
had quarreled with the local prosecutors. But that was not the only 
reason for her disappearance. Frau Haas' sixteen year old son, a 
proud and headstrong boy who served as an apprentice with the East 
German merchant marine, on one of his trips passing the Gibraltar 
Strait had made use of the occasion, jumped ship, and drowned while 
trying to swim ashore. As the mother of a "fugitive of the Republic," 
even if dead, Judge Haas could stay no longer on the Lüritz court. 
I am outraged but also puzzled by the story. It is at odds with 
what seems to me a changing political climate at the court. By 1965, 
the Lüritz Kreisgericht appears to have lost much of its missionary 
fervor. The Berlin Wall of 1961 had stopped the flood of disenchanted 
citizens fleeing West and had brought a dull sense of stability and 
permanence to the GDR. Lüritz judges are becoming increasingly 
professional in training and demeanor. No more "physical labor" 
campaigns for everyone under fifty; the program is phased out in 
1961. By the middle 1960s, the involvement of collectives in divorce 
suits, while not discontinued, has been significantly toned down and 
reduced in number. The language of the court becomes more lawyer- 
like. 
This is least true for the area of criminal law, which until the end 
of the GDR remains a handy weapon for the containment of political 
opponents. But even in criminal law, the court, by and by, outgrows 
its Manichaean view of a world separated into light and darkness. 
Since the 1960s, the prosecution of open crimes against the State 
(such as diversion or sabotage) is gradually overtaken by the prosecu- 
tion of more "normal" crimes against the community at large (such as 
theft or assault); the previous sharp ideological distinction between 
the violation of state and personal property begins to blur and then 
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disappears;40 and the most harshly punished criminals are no longer 
enemies of the state but "a-social" citizens resisting integration at the 
workplace. Only in the very last years of the GDR, when growing 
political dissent began to threaten the survival of the system, would 
something of the paranoia of the 1950s appear again in Lüritz crimi- 
nal decisions. 
But in civil law disputes, the de-politicization of the courtroom in 
the 1960s and 1970s is undeniable. It is far more evident in the be- 
havior of the court than in the legal strategies of its customers. When 
Lüritz plaintiffs and defendants wrote their briefs, they would, at all 
times, dip into political clichés as into a piggy bank with ready 
change if they believed that it would help their cause. "As far as our 
capabilities allow, we, too, are fighting for world peace," a couple try- 
ing to regain possession of their house might write in a 1951 land- 
lord-tenant dispute. "One cannot dedicate one's labor to society 
without a comfortable home," another landlord, 25 years later, would 
argue in a very similar eviction suit. Phrases such as these are com- 
mon in my Lüritz files, and they say less about their authors' political 
convictions than about their assessment of the judges and of the type 
of "arguments" that might persuade them. 
In the 1950s, demonstrations of political loyalty in someone's 
brief did not look out of place. After all, the court's own language did 
not sound all that different. But by the middle 1960s, such an- 
nouncements were more likely to annoy the court. When in 1961 the 
plaintiff in a housing dispute claims that his opponent, on national 
holidays, does not hang the GDR flag but her underpants out of the 
window, the court ignores the accusation. When in the 1970s a plain- 
tiff's father tries to win the court's support for his son's tort suit by 
describing, in a lengthy letter to the court's director, his excellent re- 
lations with the District Party Secretary, it is not Herr Krahl who 
replies but the court's secretary who in a laconic note informs the 
writer that he lacks power of attorney for his son. In 1975, the Court 
of Appeals complains in a letter to the Ministry of Justice that parties 
in divorce suits often "try to achieve positive results by declaring, in 
hollow phrases, their own devotion to the socialist state and by accus- 
ing their spouses of religious affiliations." By now, such strategies 
meet with official disapproval. As far as I can tell, the few attempts 
to openly pull rank or to impress the court with one's political connec- 
tions that I have found in the Lüritz civil files did not result in obvi- 
ously biased judgments. 
40. Unlike previous East German legislation on economic rimes, the new GDR 
Criminal Code of 1968 no longer sanctioned the theft or embezzlement of state prop- 
erty more severely that that of of personal property. While regulated in different 
chapters of the code, the penalties for both offenses were the same. See StGB/GDR, 
supra n. 8, §§ 161, 162, 180, 181. 
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That does not mean that by the 1960s civil litigation in Lüritz 
was immune to politics. But by the time a case had reached the 
court, the perfect moment for exerting political pull usually had been 
missed. I have the impression that, by now, Lüritz judges saw them- 
selves as professionals and tried to guard the independence that their 
Constitution had promised them.41 Unlike their Western colleagues, 
they interpreted their independence very narrowly, almost in territo- 
rial terms: they wanted to keep their courtroom clean. No Lüritz 
judge in, say, 1975 would have disputed the legitimacy of inspections 
and guidelines by the Ministry of Justice or the superior courts, the 
weekly Party meetings at the courthouse, the monthly "security con- 
ferences" in which the director of the Kreisgericht met with his col- 
leagues from the Interior Department and the police to discuss public 
safety in the district, and all the other techniques by which the state 
insured the law's subservience to its political goals. But the immedi- 
ate process of adjudication was different. Lüritz judges were posi- 
tiviste: they clung, as much as possible, to the written law. If that 
law clashed with the priorities of local politics, a Lüritz judge, rather 
than compromise legal rules, would try to transfer the conflict from 
his or her own jurisdiction onto the domain of other government or 
Party bodies. 
Here is an example. In a 1976 private eviction suit against a wo- 
man whom the Party apparently wanted to see well-housed, Judge 
Krahl wrote to the Lüritz Housing Department to complain that the 
defendant had not yet been assigned an adequate alternative apart- 
ment. "If this does not happen soon, I will have to set a date for trial. 
In our conversation with Comrade L. from the District Leadership, 
we had agreed that I should wait awhile." Obviously, the plaintiffs 
claim to evict the Party's protege must have been supported by the 
law. Comrade L., trying to ensure her housing, had asked Judge 
Krahl to go slow and had ordered his colleague from the housing of- 
fice to find the defendant comparable housing. But he had not told 
Herr Krahl to reject a legitimate eviction claim. Judge Krahl was 
willing to delay the case a bit but not to an extent that amounted to a 
denial of that claim. All three participants in the affair seem to agree 
that, while the Party must be able to protect its clients, law is law. 
The courtroom in this story appears as an enclave of legality in a 
world otherwise dominated by politics. 
It could become this enclave because, by the 1960s, all politically 
touchy social issues had been removed from the court's jurisdiction. 
Economic disputes were handled by the contract courts42 (semi-judi- 
cial bodies operating under interventionist rules of procedure), con- 
41. Art. 96 Constitution of the GDR of April 6, 1968 in the version of Oct. 7, 1974, 
GBl. I 425. 
42. Supra n. 37. 
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flicts between citizens and administration could not be brought to 
court but only be raised in informal complaint procedures,43 and con- 
stitutional issues were in any case immune to judicial review. That 
left the courts with legal disputes among citizens and with those rare 
cases in which state-owned enterprises sued citizens, or, rarer still, in 
which citizens sued state-owned enterprises over consumer issues. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, about 70% of all civil cases handled by the 
Liiritz Kreisgericht involved litigation between individual people. 
The civil law, under Capitalism the all-important matrix of market 
interactions, in the GDR had been reduced to what East Germans 
themselves called "after-hours law" ( Feierabend-Recht ): a set of rules 
governing the personal relationships of men and women with no 
claim to riches, power, or influence. No wonder that the Liiritz 
judges could afford to keep this unimportant law relatively free from 
political interference. 
The downgrading of civil law in the GDR also brought its democ- 
ratization. In capitalist private law, the "haves" tend to sue the 
"have-nots", or plaintiffs with money tend to sue defendants who can- 
not pay their bills, and usually win.44 In Liiritz, the hierarchical in- 
cline between plaintiffs and defendants was leveled: "have-nots" 
were suing "have-nots." Capitalist civil case files smell of money - 
my Liiritz civil case files smell of poverty. It is not just that the paper 
is so poor, the sums involved so low, that the plaintiffs and defend- 
ants so obviously are not people with big bank accounts but working 
men and women and often pensioners. In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
the civil suits themselves, in 40% to 45% of the cases, did not have 
sums of money as their objects (such as contract damages or tort 
claims) but challenged someone's bad behavior (such as the inconsid- 
erate use of common spaces in apartment buildings) or asked for the 
return of objects (such as TVs, cellars, gardens, and the like). And 
even suits for money, in 60% to 70% of the cases, did not involve what 
I call market debts (that is, debts arising from the commercial sale of 
goods or services) but personal debts, arising from a one-time interac- 
tion between private actors (a private loan; a sale between neighbors 
or acquaintances). 
For the participants, these disputes were not less important be- 
cause they involved objects of little value. On the contrary: in a nar- 
row world, fights over boundaries of individual territory may gain 
great importance and some of the favorite objects of these fights re- 
flect the parties' longing for more space and for a more independent 
lifestyle. Many legal quarrels deal with keys to entry halls, attics, 
43. On East German complaint procedures, see Markovits, "Rechtsstaat oder 
Beschwerdestaat? Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in der DDR," 31 Recht in Ost und West 
265 (1987). 
44. Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead, 9 Law & Society Review 95 
(1974). 
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cellars, and the like that Lüritz tenants often had to use in common 
with their neighbors; with allotment gardens on the outskirts of the 
city (the average East German's cherished place of refuge); or with 
cars (the most escapist object of desire under Socialism, and the most 
difficult to come by). But while these lawsuits mattered greatly to 
the litigants, they mattered not at all to the economy at large. Civil 
law in the GDR did not help to keep prices low, quality high, business 
practices fair, or to assist the flow of goods on the market. It had, in 
fact, been privatized - an ironic result in a legal system that de- 
spised everything private and disliked the very word so much that 
the term "private law" was deemed improper and was consistently 
replaced by "civil law." 
Together with the personal character of civil litigation came a 
"warmer" way of disputing. I have put the word in quotation marks 
because much of this warmth was make-believe. Are family quarrels 
"warmer" than fights between strangers? Because, indeed, much of 
the civil litigation happening in Lüritz looked like family feuds. In 
capitalist legal systems, parties to civil suits tend to be socially dis- 
tant and friends or acquaintances sue each other only if they are suf- 
ficiently estranged not to care if the lawsuit ruptures the social bond 
between them. But in Lüritz, citizens seemed to sue each other not in 
spite of, but because of their human proximity. In 1982, 43.8% of all 
civil parties and 61.5% of all parties in lawsuits between individual 
citizens were either related to each other, had once been married or 
co-habited, or lived in the same house. People sue in Lüritz because 
they have to share space or possessions that they would rather use 
alone. They seem to live too close for comfort. 
The atmosphere of civil trials, too, is close - often, artificially 
close. About twice as many civil disputes in the GDR as in the Fed- 
eral Republic ended in in-court settlements:45 to a legal system that 
wants to unite its citizens in collective peace, a judgment, that is, the 
imposition of a verdict from above that is not equally accepted by 
both parties, must indeed appear to be a pedagogic failure.46 In 
Lüritz, civil law judgments dropped from about 48% in 1946 to 17.6% 
45. In 1985, 8.3% of all first-instance civil suits before West German 
Amtsgerichte ended with in-court settlements; ee Statistisches Jahrbuch für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1988 , Statistisches Bundesamt, (ed.) (Stuttgart 1988) at 
331. In the same year, 43.3% of all civil cases processed by the Lüritz Kreisgericht 
were settled in court. 
46. In the Federal Republic, too, settlements are most frequent in those first-in- 
stance civil law disputes which in their simplicity and in the parental atmosphere in 
which they are decided most closely resemble a typical civil law suit in the GDR: cases 
which do not require an evidentiary hearing (that is, relatively uncomplicated cases), 
which are decided by a single judge (rather than a more formal and distant panel of 
judges), and in which both parties are private citizens who are personally present at 
the trial and can speak for themselves. See Hubert Rottleuthner tal., Rechtstatsäch- 
liche Untersuchungen zum Einsatz des Einzelrichters (1992) at 132, 142. 
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in 1985.47 Settlements were encouraged by the law (court costs were 
halved if the parties settled)48 and the courts seems to have leaned on 
parties to agree: in part, to look good at the next review of their per- 
formance, and in part, I suspect, to save the judges the trouble of 
writing a reasoned decision. The judges must, at times, have leaned 
quite heavily. One of the citizens' complaints found in the wood cellar 
is from a plaintiff who reproaches the court of first pressuring him 
into a settlement and, then, of refusing to include the fact that he had 
objected to the pressure in the trial record. The judge had been so 
rattled by this bellicose behavior that he had reported the incident to 
the Court of Appeals. 
Occasionally, the court pushed for a settlement even in cases in 
which the law was clearly on one party's side. Take this 1974 case of 
a young man who, for 150 marks, bought a used bicycle from an old 
lady who had advertised it in the want-ads. He had inspected the 
bicycle, paid for it, and brought it home but, when his wife was unim- 
pressed by the new purchase, regretted it, returned the bicycle to the 
seller's house, left it standing in her courtyard, and now sued to get 
his money back. The old lady, understandably, refused to pay: "Our 
sale was perfect and Herr W. can state no reasons for disputing it." 
But at the trial, Herr Krahl talks the seller into returning 25 marks 
to the purchaser and closes the case with a "settlement." As the case 
illuminates, it was no accident that East German law replaced the 
traditional German term for "settlement" ( Vergleich - literally: 
"comparison") with 
" Einigung 
" 
(agreement). The law cared less about 
the process of comparative give-and-take than about the hopefully re- 
sulting outcome: social harmony. To this legal system, even a grudg- 
ing peace or pretended harmony seemed better than a zero-sum 
solution which left the parties disconnected by their win or loss. As 
in the case of the old lady and her bike, much of the "harmony" in 
Lüritz settlements was fake. About a third of all "agreements" in my 
files happened in cases that, in fact, might just as well have been 
resolved by judgments, because no compromise between the parties 
softened the defeated party's loss - the winner took all. But after 
their decision in the dispute, the judges in these cases apparently 
persuaded the participants to clothe the all-or-nothing outcome of 
their fight in the more conciliatory garb of a settlement: to save 
themselves some work and the parties' court costs and to uphold the 
image of social harmony restored. 
Over the years, Lüritz plaintiffs and defendants adjusted to a le- 
gal process more interested in collective peace than in the protection 
47. In the Federal Republik, in 1985, 28.7% of all civil cases litigated at the 
Amtsgericht level ended in a contested judgment. See Statistisches Jahrbuch , supra 
n. 45, at 331. 
48. Zivilprozeßordnung (Code of Civil Procedure; henceforth ZPO) of June 19, 
1975, GBl. I p. 533, § 166 para. 3 
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of individual autonomy. At least that is what my files suggest. Away 
from the files, court users may have grumbled. More self-possessed 
and self-assertive people may have shunned the court and tried to 
pursue their interests in other ways, particularly those who had con- 
nections: there are very few intellectuals in my civil files and (apart 
from the divorce files) very few people whom you might call "middle 
class." But in my records, evidence of open protest against the court's 
parental and didactic manner (like that complaint against unwanted 
settlements) is very rare. 
People learned to rely more on the court's good will than on their 
own combativeness. In 1979, 17.6% of civil litigants in Lüritz used a 
lawyer, down from 42.5% in 1946. Representation by counsel was 
even less common in criminal cases: in 1979, only 17 of 306 defend- 
ants in Lüritz (or 5.6%) faced their trial with an attorney by their 
side. Indeed, defense attorneys must have seemed somewhat out of 
place in a courtroom so saturated with affirmations (or at least pre- 
tenses) of community. Remember that in the early 1950s Lüritz 
judges deviated in almost half of all criminal cases from the prosecu- 
tor's suggested penalty. By 1979, judges concurred with the prosecu- 
tor's assessment of the crime in 91.3% of all trials. Faced with the 
united front of court and prosecution, most defense attorneys 
watched their step and only cautiously argued their client's case. 
Some simply joined the prosecutor's penalty suggestion. Others, 
rather than disputing the legal merits of the prosecution, contented 
themselves with pleading mitigating circumstances. "I've never un- 
derstood what they got their money for," a former Lüritz judge once 
said to me about defense attorneys. That might have been unfair be- 
cause a lawyer could help a defendant plan the most effective strat- 
egy without engaging in a rousing battle in the courtroom. But even 
clever and aggressive counsel often advised their clients of the bene- 
fits of true confessions49 - they knew that socialist judges liked a 
defendant "who in the face of society accepted responsibility for his 
offense."50 Most Lüritz criminals readily confessed, frequently even 
to portions of their crime that the police did not yet know about. And 
although East German law gave a testimonial privilege to spouses 
and close relatives not only in criminal51 but also in civil trials52, I 
found only two or three instances in my files where witnesses made 
use of their right not to testify. Most of my Lüritz protagonists seem 
49. Such as the attorney Gregor Gysi who after the collapse of Socialism was to 
become the head of the East German Party for Democratic Socialism. See Gysi, "Auf- 
gaben des Verteidigers bei der Belehrung, Beratung und Unterstützung des 
Beschuldigten im Ermittlungsverfahren," 39 Neue Justiz 416 (1985). 
50. Beschluß des Plenums des Obersten Gerichts zu Fragen der gerichtlichen 
Beweisaufnahme of September 30, 1970, 11 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts in 
Strafsachen 63 (1970). 
51. StPO/GDR supra n. 8, § 26. 
52. ZPO/GDR supra n. 47, § 56 
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to have found it more advisable to cooperate with the authorities 
than to openly resist them. 
Parties to litigation also learned to rely on the court's help and 
solicitude in situations in which capitalist plaintiffs and defendants 
have to fend for themselves. For instance, the Lüritz court routinely 
provided the addresses of defendants that the plaintiffs had been too 
lazy to find out themselves; indeed, much of the court's administra- 
tive efforts were taken up with locating the employers of fathers ow- 
ing child support. If plaintiffs failed to fill out some forms properly, 
the court would do its best not to let the omission spoil their case. 
When in 1984 a divorce plaintiff, for the second time, sends an incom- 
plete application to initiate suit, the court's secretary returns the 
forms and writes: "I have used your previous communications to for- 
mulate the correct complaint. I am including the original and two 
copies in this letter. Please read the application carefully and, if I 
have accurately stated your reasons for seeking a divorce, sign all 
three copies and return them to the court." The prospective plaintiff 
does not bother to reply. In 1978, a woman writes "addressee will 
pay" on the unstamped envelope of her divorce complaint, and the 
court, indeed, does pay. When the judge invites her to discuss the 
case and suggests a time, she neither responds nor comes. Quite 
often, civil parties do not come at the appointed time, come late, or 
with the flimsiest of excuses ask for a change of date. The court is 
usually generous. It patiently reschedules hearings for parties want- 
ing to go on holidays, for lawyers claiming business out of town, and 
for a prosecutor planning to celebrate his birthday on the date in 
question. Here is a note found in the record of a contract case from 
1982: "Oral argument was scheduled for 11:00 a.m. As the court ex- 
pected the defendant to be late, it waited until 11:30 to begin the 
hearing. Since the defendant had not shown by noon, the time for the 
announcement of the verdict is now set for 12:30." Incidentally, this 
verdict would not be a default judgment as we know it. East German 
civil procedure did not allow for decisions by default, since a judg- 
ment based only on the unilateral assertions of one party would 
neither uncover the real truth (or what Socialists called "the material 
truth") about a social dispute nor allow for a therapeutic airing of the 
conflict that might help to reconnect the former adversaries. Even if 
only one of the parties appeared at trial, the court had to investigate 
the merits of the case.53 
My files reveal that Lüritz citizens grew lazy, maybe even com- 
fortable, in the arms of a legal system that would neither let them go 
nor allow them to drop behind or fall between the cracks. They also, 
occasionally, got fresh. It is a calculated impudence, quite often 
53. ZPO/GDR supra n. 47, § 67 paras. 2 and 3; see also Kommentar zur Zivil- 
prozeßordnung, Ministry of Justice of the GDR, (ed.), § 67 ZPO note 3 (1987). 
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skirting the political but (except for the very last years of the GDR) 
always suggesting that the angry writer, if treated property, will re- 
main a member of the fold. "If this kind of thing can happen in a 
social court, one truly begins to wonder about our entire legal sys- 
tem," a tenant writes in 1969, appealing the decision of a "dispute 
commission" to the Lüritz Kreisgericht. "I'm worse off here than 
someone unemployed is in the Federal Republic," a putative father 
proclaims in a 1978 paternity dispute, outraged, because the neces- 
sary blood tests take forever. "Valid complaint," a handwritten re- 
mark says on the folder of his case. "I am a free citizen of the GDR 
and can expect the Youth Agency to work as diligently as I am work- 
ing," a mother announces in a child support suit in 1981, cleverly pre- 
empting any objection that the Agency might raise by characterizing 
it as a violation of her "freedom." Occasionally, parties threaten the 
court that if they do not get their due they may withdraw from collec- 
tive life by not voting in the next elections or - a risky strategy - by 
slowing down or quitting work. One cannot imagine threats like 
these to ever have been uttered in a Nazi court. They made sense 
only in a legal system that, at least in theory, wanted to be all-inclu- 
sive. But inclusion came at a price. If there is a common denomina- 
tor, a red thread running through all these records, it is the 
assumption of a silent bargain between citizen and state: submission 
for solicitude, adaptation for guidance, dependency for warmth. Even 
deviants were welcome if they were willing to return to the collective. 
This is why I find the story of Frau Haas' firing so disturbing. Was 
the contamination by her son's attempted "flight from the Republic" 
so shameful for the mother that it outweighed her own loyalty to So- 
cialism? Or was it Frau Haas' troubled relationship with the prose- 
cutors (who in East German legal culture ranked higher on the 
political pecking order than the judges) that cost her the job in 
Lüritz? By the system's own rules, a capable and committed judge, 
even if headstrong, deserved better than to be run out of town. 
Over the 40 years of the GDRs existence, fewer East German 
judges lost their jobs for political reasons than one might have 
thought.54 This was not due to political tolerance (of which the sys- 
tem had very little) but rather to the selection and self-selection of 
the GDR judiciary. Of the professional judges who survived the post- 
war de-nazification wave but who were critical of Socialism, many 
54. A study of a sample of 60 disciplinary proceedings against East German 
judges that took place between 1953 and 1961 found that politics played a role in only 
eight cases (or 13% of the sample). Since the 1950s were politically more repressive 
than the post- Wall years (the majority of the eight cases arose in connection with the 
workers' rebellion of June 17, 1953), it is unlikely that the share of political dismissals 
of East German judges rose in later years. See Thomas Lorenz, Das Disziplinarrecht 
für Berufsrichter in der DDR von 1949 bis 1963, in: Rottleuthner, ed ., Steuerung der 
Justiz in der DDR , supra n. 4, at 397, 383. 
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fled West long before the Wall was built. The restructuring of the 
East German court system in 195256 provided the government with 
the occasion to rid itself of the remaining bourgeois judges56 - this 
must have been the reason why Judge Wapnewski left the Liiritz 
bench in 1952. By 1957, 69% of all judges and prosecutors in the 
GDR were graduates of the new training courses for "people's 
judges":57 all people likely to support the system. So were the gradu- 
ates of the new law faculties. And, maybe most important, socialist 
judges were in short supply. Judicial salaries were kept intentionally 
low since judges were not supposed to be separated by their rank and 
income from the ordinary men and women whom they served.58 
Workloads, by socialist standards, were high. Recruitment was ein 
eternal problem. A judge dismissed would almost always be difficult 
to replace. As a result, East German justice authorities tended to 
hold on even to unsatisfactory judges as long as possible. 
Nevertheless, besides Frau Haas, I know of three other Liiritz 
judges who left the bench for other than innocuous grounds (such as 
retirement or relocation). All four departures could be called "politi- 
cal," though not because of the judges' own hostility to Socialism but 
because of some connection, often unintended, with the West that in 
the friend-foe mentality of this obsessive state made someone thus 
contaminated no longer suitable for public service. Still, in three of 
the four cases, political paranoia was softened by another feature of 
the system: parental concern for the welfare of each citizen. Frau 
Dahlmann, an early "people's judge," had to leave the Liiritz bench in 
1953 because of her daughter's flight to West Berlin. She was given a 
new job as head of the Liiritz Youth Authority. Herr Sommer, one of 
the later judges, was kicked out in 1982 because his teenage son had 
sold some wristwatches, sent by an aunt in West Berlin, on the black 
market. The Party group at the Liiritz court had opposed his dismis- 
sal but was overruled by the Regional Court of Appeals. Herr Som- 
mer was made legal counsel of the Liiritz Housing Agency. And 
finally, Herr Krahl, tired and disillusioned, left in 1984 at his own 
initiative, quite a feat for a judge in a legal system that equated giv- 
ing notice with desertion. He owed his unopposed departure to the 
assistance of the Liiritz First Party Secretary, who also helped him 
find a new job as legal counsel of the District Hospital. All three 
judges, although officially disgraced, had been allowed to stay in 
Liiritz. All three had been provided with satisfactory new jobs. 
55. Verordnung über die Neugliederung der Gerichte (Decree on the Restructur- 
ing of the Court System) of Aug. 28, 1952, GBl. p. 791 (1952). 
56. By September 1, 1952, the GDR Ministry of Justice had dismissed a total of 
104 judges, almost 10% of the country's judiciary. See Lorenz, supra n. 53, at 381 
57. Reported by Amos, Justizverwaltung i  der SBZ/DDR , supra n. 27, at 178. 
58. Andreas Gängel, Richter in der DDR - Wunschbild und Realitätsausschnitte, 
in: Rottleuthner, Steuerung der Justiz in der DDR , supra n. 10, at 395, 407. 
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None, as far as I can tell from my records, was as faithful a Socialist 
as Frau Haas. Was it her own political loyalty that made her son's 
attempted flight look all the more offensive? Was it her stubbornness 
and independence that, given the right pretext, could make it easier 
for hostile administrators to get rid of her? "They could do that only 
to a woman," Frau Rviter had said when she told me the story. Frau 
Haas' opponents at the prosecutor's office had been men. Whatever 
the reason for Judge Haas' removal - by responding to a human trag- 
edy with self-righteous rejection, Frau Haas' superiors had not only 
failed her but also betrayed their own humanist ambitions. 
4. Disintegration 
By the 1980s, grudging acceptance of life under Socialism in the 
GDR was beginning to wear thin and, with it, the legal system's 
claims (or pretenses) to collective harmony. The change of mood an- 
nounced itself in the court statistics. Since the early 1970s, civil liti- 
gation rates in the GDR had slowly begun to climb; they rose more 
rapidly beginning in 1980.59 The number of civil suits in Lüritz grew 
from 160 at the beginning of the decade to 228 in 1987 - far fewer, 
still, than in the early post-war years but enough to make local 
judges complain about excessive workloads. Litigation became more 
aggressive: in Lüritz, the share of judgments (that is, of those dis- 
putes fought out to the bitter end) increased from 12.5% of all civil 
cases in 1976 to 26.9% in 1988. Lüritz litigants began to use more 
lawyers: between 1979 and 1988, representation by counsel rose 
from 15.3% to 21.3% of all civil parties and from 5.6% to 16% of all 
criminal defendants. And money seemed to matter a little more: 
while in 1979, 56.6% of civil suits in Lüritz centered on monetary 
claims (rather than on objects or behavior), by 1988 fights over money 
had increased to 62.7% of the civil case load. 
Lüritz attorneys, too, began to represent their clients more asser- 
tively. In 1984, a third lawyer was admitted to practice in Lüritz - a 
much needed addition, since it had become difficult to find represen- 
tation locally and I had frequently encountered the names of out-of- 
town attorneys in my Lüritz files. One of the out-of-towners in par- 
ticular had caught my attention: Herr Fuchs, who practiced in a little 
town not far from Lüritz, to whom those Lüritz clients seemed to 
flock whose cases were most desperate and who simply refused to 
play by the sedate and passive rules for lawyerly behavior under So- 
cialism. I would eventually meet him in person: a small, flamboyant 
59. In the GDR, the sum total of first instance civil suits rose from 31,820 in 1971 
to 42,957 in 1979 (an increase to 135% of the 1971 case load) and to 66,999 cases in 
1987 (an increase to 211% of the 1971 case load). See Statistisches Bundesamt, (ed.), 
Sonderreihe mit Beiträgen für das Gebiet der ehemaligen DDR, no. 10, Rechtspflege, 
Gerichte, Verfahrensstatistik 1971 - 1990 (Wiesbaden 1994) at 66 and 67. 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 09 Jun 2015 17:25:31 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
860 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 50 
man with a terrier's fighting spirit, rumored to be gay, someone who 
loved to walk a tightrope, and on more than one account an outsider 
not only under Socialism. It may have been the outsider's experience 
of difference that made Herr Fuchs resistant to the comforts of collec- 
tivism. His chutzpah shines through even the grey and mottled type- 
script of an East German trial record. In 1984, in the dismissal case 
of an enterprise director who had been accused of spreading jokes 
about First Secretary Honecker, Herr Fuchs demanded that all the 
jokes be entered, verbatim, into the record of the case so that the ap- 
pellate court could assess their harmfulness. As I am sure Herr 
Fuchs anticipated, the court (unlike Frau Haas in 1958) did not com- 
ply with the request. 
In the same year, Herr Fuchs won the appeal of a man accused of 
joyriding by advising his client to recant his original confession 
which, as Herr Fuchs could show, conflicted with other evidence 
presented by the prosecution. In East German criminal procedure, 
acquittals were even rarer than in Western legal systems.60 But 
more indicative of the approaching change of weather in the law 
seems to me the fact that the acquittal followed the withdrawal of a 
confession. Since GDR law, like the law of other states in continental 
Europe, did not know guilty pleas, even confessions did not relieve 
the court of the investigation of a defendant's guilt.61 But as religions 
tend to do, Socialism believed that confessions were good for the soul. 
They signaled a defendant's acknowledgment of communal norms 
and his desire to return into the fold. Recanting a confession thus 
meant more than just undermining a specific piece of evidence: it 
showed the defendant to recoil from the open arms held out by the 
parental state to its repentant sinners. The recantation sent a cold 
draft into the sticky warmth of an East German courtroom. To judge 
by the extraordinary rarity of withdrawn confessions in my files, 
most Lüritz criminal defendants must have sensed that it was not a 
good idea to alienate authorities on whose good will their fate de- 
pended. Herr Fuchs seemed not to mind. 
In 1985 one of the three Lüritz attorneys follows Herr Fuchs' ex- 
ample and counsels a defendant to recant a previous confession. It is 
HerrrBusch, a smart and conscientious man, more measured than 
Herr Fuchs, but always on the look-out for effective ways to serve his 
clients. From then on, I find a number of withdrawn confessions in 
the Lüritz files, sometimes accompanied by hints that the confessions 
60. In my Lüritz sample, acquittals dropped from 7.4% of all verdicts in 1952 to 
less than 1% in the 1970s and 1980s. 
61. The GDR Supreme Court, for decades, struggled with issues of evidence m 
criminal proceedings, in particular, with the truthfulness ofconfessions, and in three 
Resolutions from 1970, 1978, and 1988, set increasingly cautious guidelines directing 
trial courts' evaluations of confessions. See Jörg Arnold, Die Normalität des 
Strafrechts in der DDR, vol. II at 179 - 190 (Freiburg 1996). 
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were the result of undue pressure by investigators. "Violation of a 
defendant's right to counsel" is another novel charge that now occa- 
sionally crops up in my records, mostly on appeal. In 1988, in a case 
involving a messy arrest for "a-social behavior," Herr Busch goes so 
far as to raise accusations of police brutality. I find an outraged let- 
ter of the local prosecutor in the file suggesting that Herr Busch him- 
self should be made the subject of a disciplinary investigation. 
Instead, the court at least addresses the charges of police misconduct 
at the trial even if it finds only minor errors of judgment by the of- 
ficers involved. 
As the case shows, the change in legal climate affected not only 
lawyers but the court as well. Lüritz judges are losing faith. They 
seem less hopeful than in earlier years that they can help to bring 
about that change in human nature that Socialism and its law were 
striving for. Some Lüritz figures of the 1980s suggest that the court's 
didactic efforts are slackening: suspension of divorce suits (to give 
the couple an impetus and time for reconciliation) down from 11% of 
all divorce cases in 1980 to 6.3% of all divorce cases in 1989; involve- 
ment of collectives in divorce trials (to link personal and communal 
interests in the marriage) down from 24.3% of all divorces in 1980 to 
6% in 1989. But the decline in numbers reflects ideological tiredness 
rather than a conscious change of direction. I find less social opti- 
mism in the Lüritz records but still the same conviction that it is up 
to the state to guide its citizens towards their own and society's im- 
provement. My Lüritz judges seem worried at the signs of change 
around them. Such worries, and a proposal for how to deal with 
them, show in a letter by which the director of the Regional Court of 
Appeals describes to the Ministry of Justice the 1981 visit of a group 
of Polish High Court judges in the Lüritz area. The Regional Court 
Director had invited the guests to dinner in her home "to talk more 
openly," as she explained in her long account of the meeting to the 
Ministry. It was, indeed, an open conversation. The Poles, one of 
them even a member of Solidarity, had spoken to their Germern hosts 
about the current political chaos in their country and about their 
hopes to restore normalcy through economic reforms. "I have the im- 
pression that the Polish comrades place insufficient emphasis on the 
need for tight leadership by the Party and the State," writes the Ger- 
man judge in her report, responding to disorder with the very Ger- 
man call for more discipline. 
The Lüritz trial court judges probably would have agreed with 
her. In uncertain times it is important to close ranks. My court's 
relation with the prosecutor's office is a case in point. At least since 
the 1960s, Lüritz criminal trials had been dominated by what Herr 
Busch once described to me as the "unholy alliance" between judge 
and prosecutor, who in the GDR functioned neither as counter- 
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weights to one another nor as independent actors each following his 
or her own script but as collaborators, pursuing together the contain- 
ment and reeducation of offenders. My Lüritz files contain no evi- 
dence of that "alliance's" weakening in the last decade of the court's 
existence. If, in 1979, the penalties meted out by Lüritz judges devi- 
ated from those suggested by the prosecution only in 8.7% of all cases, 
that figure in 1988 still is just 9%. Lüritz judges continue to cooper- 
ate with other agencies of State authority in the control of deviants 
by, for instance, informing the city's Department of Interior Affairs of 
"a-social" citizens requiring supervision and, occasionally, even by 
communicating suspicions of planned emigrations and the like to the 
Secret Police. When in the last two years before die Wende, would-be 
immigrants in Lüritz publicly begin to clamor for their exit visas, 
criminal law judges come down hard on the protestors. In 1988, a 
Lüritz crane driver who brings a rope to Town Hall and threatens to 
hang himself if his visa application is denied is punished with 14 
months in prison for "interfering with the activities of state author- 
ity"62 despite his lawyer's efforts to describe him as "a simple man." 
Several doctors who, on successive Sundays, clothed in black, stage 
silent "promenades" on the Lüritz market square to publicize their 
unsuccessful efforts to emigrate, after weeks in prison, are let off 
with some heavy fines - again for "interference." Cases like these 
are almost always tried in the regional capital to avoid political con- 
tagion and embarrassment in Lüritz. Until the end, socialist law 
tries to keep up appearances. That also holds for the appearance of 
social harmony. When, also in 1988, a junior judge at the Lüritz 
court, in a dispute over a garage, sues his opponent, the court's direc- 
tor simply removes his complaint from the docket. "A judge does not 
litigate," she informs her colleague. A parent does not quarrel in 
front of the children. 
But the sense of political weariness that sets in in the 1980s, the 
loss of faith, the smell of change, even of decay, affects the different 
protagonists in my Lüritz story in different ways. The pupils of the 
law - Lüritz's ordinary men and women - react by becoming more 
disrespectful of the law's authority. Between the 1950s and the 
1980s, East Germany had experienced little open political dissent: 
much less, for instance, than its Czech or Polish neighbors, and for a 
period lasting more than 30 years, I have found very few crimes of 
political disobedience in my Lüritz records. By 1987 that begins to 
change. The Ausreiser begin to populate my Lüritz files, in literal 
translation, "outbound travelers," though most of them are not al- 
lowed to travel in the direction they prefer and therefore, in one way 
or the other, run afoul of East German law: by publicly demanding 
the freedom to move guaranteed in the Helsinki Agreements, by en- 
62. StGB/GDR, supra n. 8, § 214. 
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listing the help of Western authorities to underscore their claims, or 
by challenging demotions or dismissals which often followed some- 
one's application for an exit visa. The number of political offenses 
committed in Lüritz but adjudicated in the regional capital is ris- 
ing.63 So is the number of "fugitives from the Republic."64 
Even representatives of the unpolitical and until then, largely 
silent, majority in town no longer hide their disaffection. In my 
Lüritz records, civic discontent appears in many guises. Litigants 
(and often, officials, too) no longer fill out the numerous question- 
naires that accompanied East German law suits by which the plan- 
ners in Berlin tried to gather data that could help their social 
engineering efforts. Items number 21 and 22 of the East German 
questionnaire for divorce plaintiffs, for instance, asked for the names 
and addresses of collectives or their representatives who had been, or 
still could be, called upon to mediate a marriage conflict. "None, 
since I have not talked about my problems with anyone," is a reply in 
1980. "None, I consider that useless!," someone else writes in the 
same year. "I do not want to wash dirty laundry, I only want a di- 
vorce," a plaintiff responds in 1985. By the late 1980s, the questions 
almost always are left blank. 
Petitions to the court that in the past had only threatened social 
abstinence if their author's plea for help would not be met (such as 
the announcement that the petitioner would fail to vote) now openly 
declare that the applicant, if disappointed, might altogether turn his 
back on Socialism. In 1982, the defendant in a suit brought by the 
Lüritz public utilities company thus informs the court: "I have ap- 
plied to the Department of Interior Affairs for permission to move" - 
he does not need to tell the court where he wants to move to. Even in 
the fall of 1989, an ex-husband, asking for assistance in a dispute 
with his former wife over the couple's old apartment, tells the court: 
"So many have left already. But I want to stay. If I get what I am 
entitled to. Please help me." And although open threats like these 
are fairly rare, there are many little signs by which those coming into 
contact with the law show that it does not rank very high on their 
scale of values: a woman gives false evidence because the interested 
party has promised to tile her roof; somebody else ignores the need to 
respond to litigation because "she is in the process of wallpapering 
63. While in the 1970s and earlier 1980s, about l%-3% of Lüritz criminal defend- 
ants were prosecuted in the regional capital, that figure rose to 5.5% by 1988. Most of 
those defendants either had tried to illegally leave the country or had contacted West- 
ern authorities - a crime called Verbindungsaufnahme ("establishing connections" 
§ 219 StGB) - informing them about their arduous quest for exist visas. 
64. On East German "fugitives from the Republic" see Hirschmann, "Exit, Voice 
and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History," 
45 World Politics no. 2 (January 1993); Markovits, "Two Truths About Socialist Jus- 
tice: A Comment on Kommers," 22 Law & Social Inquiry 849, 866 (1997). 
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her apartment." Usually, the court meets such excuses with surpris- 
ing lenience. 
But though the citizens of Lüritz seem less respectful of their le- 
gal system (or, possibly, just less fearful of the state), they still re- 
main the products of an authoritarian society. Their loss of faith in 
Socialism has not transformed the men and women I encounter in my 
files into carbon copies of capitalist legal men. They are distrustful of 
their state, but they still expect it to look out for them. They rely on 
the court's help and advice as much as ever. Civil litigation in Lüritz 
still is something of a family affair. If, in 1982, 43.8% of all parties 
involved in civil suits were relatives or close acquaintances, that fig- 
ure, by 1988, is 39.5% - not much of a drop. As I read the files, Lüritz 
people are still accustomed to collective warmth. They are as suspi- 
cious of outsiders as ever, whether over-ambitious go-getters or those 
who refuse to pull their load. 
Their views on Assis or "a-social" citizens are a case in point. I 
know about those views from the post-mortems that the court ar- 
ranged at a defendant's enterprise in cases in which someone's con- 
viction could serve as a lesson to his fellow workers. The 
questionnaire (yet another questionnaire!) filled out on those occa- 
sions contained the item "How does the collective assess the outcome 
and impact of the trial?" To judge by their responses, work collectives 
felt far more sympathy for comrades convicted of assault and battery 
or drunk driving them for people sentenced for work evasion. "Too 
lenient," is the usual reaction to an Assi's penalty. "It probably won't 
help," is another standard comment. Fellow workers had reasons to 
be angry at an Assi because his absenteeism affected the performance 
of the collective as a whole and thus each member's bonuses. But 
they also seem contemptuous of an Assis' otherness: the irregular 
rhythm of his days, his lack of discipline, his dubious friends, his in- 
ability to lead an orderly and integrated life. "The collective discus- 
sion with colleague L. demanded by your agency will not take place," 
an enterprise flatly informs the Lüritz police in 1984 - those work- 
ing by the rules are sick and tired of taking care of deviants. A 1987 
trial of five Lüritz police officers who, legitimated by their uniforms, 
systematically had stopped vagrants, drunks, and other Assi- types 
for searches and seizures, had checked their pockets, ransacked their 
apartments, and had stolen whatever valuables they could lay their 
hands on, reveals how deep and wide-spread the contempt for Assis 
was among the upright folks of Lüritz. "We thought of them as a 
lower class of citizens," one of the policemen testified (behind closed 
doors, of course, because the public was excluded from the trial). So- 
cialist law had taught him to think of Assis as "a lower class of citi- 
zen:" they were considered weak and selfish deserters from a common 
enterprise. The political disillusionment of the 1980s affected my 
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Lüritz citizen's respect for law. But it could not erase the habits and 
reflexes acquired in a lifetime under Socialism. 
It strikes me as significant that at that 1987 trial of the five po- 
licemen the Lüritz judge no longer used the term " Asoziale " to de- 
scribe their victims but spoke of "Problembürger" - "citizens with 
problems." By the middle 1980s, laymen and experts in the GDR had 
parted ways in their assessment of the Asozialen issue. Lawyers and 
social planners could no longer close their eyes to the fact that their 
reliance on criminal law to cajole and force truants and slackers into 
regular work had largely failed. Asoziale filled East German pris- 
ons65 - in Lüritz in 1980, 19.2% of all defendants were sentenced for 
"asocial behavior" - but they did not emerge resocialized. Since 
"asocial behavior" described a lifestyle rather than a specific offense, 
recidivism among Assis was high and meant that many of them spent 
years of their adulthood behind bars. A 1983 study commissioned by 
the GDR Supreme Court revealed that 30% of all those sentenced for 
"asocial behavior" were so socially fragile and dependent that they 
could not, on their own, hold down a steady job.66 By 1985, East Ger- 
man social planners were looking for non-punitive, therapeutic ways 
to deal with the socially weakest of the Asozialen. 
Their problem was so crucial to East German thinking about law 
because it touched upon two central tenets of Socialism: its belief in 
work as a constitutive element of human dignity and its insistence on 
the educability of men. Assis did not work, and too many of them 
could not be rehabilitated. Their very existence showed that Social- 
ism had been deluded about the powers and ambitions of its legal 
system. Hence the embarrassed secrecy of the GDR's legal Asozialen- 
policy: East German law reviews carried few Asozialen judgments 
and never listed actual penalties; since 1977, Supreme Court deci- 
sions (many of which dealt with Asozialen issues) were published "for 
internal use only";67 debates about the failures of the criminalization 
65. In 1988, Asoziale made up 24.5% of the East German prison population - two 
and a half times more than those convicted of "border crimes". Reported by Luther & 
Weis, "Zur Anwendung des Strafrechts inder Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," 
34 Recht in Ost und West 289, 291 (1990). 
66. The document is published in Jörg Arnold, Die Normalität des Strafrechts in 
der DDR vol. I (Freiburg 1995) at 725. 
67. Until 1977, the GDK ¡bupreme Court published its decisions m book torm; see, 
e.g., Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts in Zivilsachen , vols. 1 - 16. The practice 
was discontinued in1977 when the Court, instead, began to distribute xeroxed collec- 
tions of decisions that appeared six times a year under the title Informationen des 
Obersten Gerichts (Informations from the Supreme Court). The volumes were num- 
bered (to trace their distribution) and until January 1988, were marked "Nur für den 
Dienstgebrauch " (for internal use only). In his introduction to the series, the then 
President of the Supreme Court asked the recipients of the volumes not to cite to 
them. As a former Supreme Court justice explained to me, the Court's decision to go 
private, so-to-speak, was made for two reasons: technical shortages had led to a too 
infrequent appearance of the volumes in book form, and the publication of opinions 
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of chronic work evasion took place behind closed doors;68 and a 1985 
decree introducing "special brigades" as sheltered work collectives for 
some of the socially most helpless Asoziale was neither published nor, 
as far as I can tell, commented on in the literature.69 
The Assis were one of the reasons for East German jurists to lose 
faith in their legal system (the rising number of Ausreiser and fugi- 
tives in the 1980s,70 for instance, was another). But Asoziale can 
serve nicely to show the relationship between political faith and law 
in East German legal history. While ordinary people reacted to the 
failed re-education of a-social citizens with cries for more state con- 
trol, jurists reacted by becoming more finicky about the application of 
repressive rules to a social problem that seemed to be impervious to 
the criminal law. In the 1980s, the Supreme Court thus repeatedly 
instructed trial courts to be more careful in determining whether a 
truant's work evasion had indeed, as the law required, "impeded 
upon public order and security";71 it insisted that trial judges care- 
fully establish the exact number of days a defendant had missed at 
work,72 and it warned judges not to glibly pass over the accused's own 
explanations for his absences but to evaluate and weigh the life situa- 
tions and motives leading to his downfall.73 Of twenty Asozialen 
cases included between 1977 and 1989 in the Supreme Court's case 
collection, eighteen came out in favor of the defendant. And there 
were other ways by which the Court and legal scholars in the 1980s 
tried to infuse greater precision into the legal diagnosis of a-social 
behavior: by refining the conditions under which Assis could receive 
heavier penalties as recidivists,74 for example, or by limiting the trig- 
dealing with such unpleasant issues such as fugitives and Asoziale had become in- 
creasingly embarassing. 
68. See, e.g., the documents published in the collection by Jörg Arnold, Die 
Normalität des Strafrechts in der DDR , vol. I, supra n. 67, p. 677-748. 
69. I know of the existence of the decree from the Liiritz files and from a few 
reports on the work of the Sonderbrigaden i  the East German legal literature; see 
Lothar Krause, Wiedereingliederung von Strafentlassenen i einer besonderen Bri- 
gade, 43 Neue Justiz 160 (1989); Kliche, "Gestaltung von Wiedereingliederungs- 
prozessen in besonderen Brigaden," 43 Neue Justiz 291 (1989). 
70. On the fluctuating numbers of Ausreiser and fugitives from the GDR to the 
Federal Republic see Ammer, "Stichwort: Flucht aus der DDR," 22 Deutschland- 
Archiv 1207 (1989) and Wendt, "Die deutsch-deutschen Wanderungen," 24 Deutsch- 
land-Archiv 390 (1991). In Lüritz, the number of arrest warrants for refugees rose 
from 14 in 1987 to 75 in 1988 and 111 in 1989. By 1989, 73% of those arrest warrants 
were for "illegal non-return", that is, for fugitives who had made use of temporary 
travel visas to West Germany or neighboring countries by not returning to the GDR. 
71. Oberstes Gericht, decision of Nov. 2, 1982, Informationen des Obersten Ge- 
richts (Informations from the Supreme Court; henceforth OGI ) 1982 no. 2 p. 10 (1982); 
Oberstes Gericht, decision of Feb. 26, 1985, OGI 1985 no. 2 p. 43 (1985). 
72. Oberstes Gericht, decision of May 7, 1981, OGI 1981 no. 4 p. 23 (1981). 
73. Oberstes Gericht, decision of Dec. 16, 1982, OGI no. 2 p. 46 (1982); Oberstes 
Gericht, decision of May 16, 1989, OGI 1989 no. 5 p. 23 (1989). 
74. See the Supreme Court documents reprinted in Arnold, vol. I, supra n. 65, at 
657-712. 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 09 Jun 2015 17:25:31 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2002] JUSTICE IN LÜRITZ 867 
ger-happy arrest policy of local courts and prosecutors75 that affected 
Asoziale more than any other group of criminal defendants in the 
GDR.76 
There was a connection between East German jurists' loss of con- 
fidence in the transformátory powers of the law and their rising con- 
cern for legal formality and precision. If you no longer believe that 
your ideology can provide right answers to important social ques- 
tions, you need to rely on formal rules to find them: doubt in the 
knowability of outcomes breeds trust in procedures. This is why capi- 
talist law that, unlike socialist law, allows for disagreement about 
desirable outcomes, places so much greater faith in due process than 
Socialism ever could. It is our political agnosticism that makes us 
rely so heavily upon fair play. East German "people's judges" of the 
1950s and early 1960s knew the right answers, or believed they did, 
and therefore had very little patience with procedural precision. It 
was only when courts no longer knew in advance which outcome to 
prefer that they had to be particular about the means by which they 
found their answers. My Lüritz data could be charted in a graph that 
shows the inverse relationship between political and legal faith as a 
steadily descending or rising curve depending on which of the two 
coordinates you picked as your indépendant variable. East German 
legal history began in the early post-war years with a strong belief in 
ideology and little trust in formal law. It ended, by the time the Wall 
collapsed, with little faith in ideological solutions and much more in- 
terest in the kind of answers found in legal rules. 
The growth of legal professionalism in the GDR contributed to 
this development. The early "people's judges" knew very little law 
and, in a complex case, could not draw upon an arsenal of doctrine to 
steer them through confusion but had to fall back on their own beliefs 
and on instructions from above. Hence the curious mixture of sim- 
plistic law, heartfelt convictions, and political orthodoxy that I find in 
the early Lüritz files. By the 1980s, East German universities, inter- 
nal scholarly debates (however cautious) and West German intellec- 
tual influences had bred a class of jurists interested in and capable of 
sophisticated legal argument. They were proud of their skills. And 
while in the final years of the GDR the pressure on East German 
jurists to demonstrate political conformity increased, the quality of 
their legal craftsmanship increased as well. Unlike the "people's 
75. On Supreme Court attempts in the 1980s to restrain the issuing of arrest war- 
rants in the GDR, see Birte E. Keppler, Die Leitungsinstrumente des Obersten Ge- 
richts. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Richtlinien und Beschlüssen zum Recht 
der Untersuchungshaft (Freiburg 1998) p. 313-37. 
76. In Lüritz, defendants prosecuted for "a-social behavior" were more likely to be 
imprisoned prior to their trial than any other group of defendants. Thus, in 1980, 85% 
of all "a-social" defendants were in preliminary detention, compared to 74% of those 
defendants accused of border violations and 20% of those prosecuted for the theft of 
state property. 
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judges" of the 1950s, judges and prosecutors in the 1980s had a stock 
of legal convictions and techniques at their disposal that could serve 
to counterbalance the demands of politics. I don't want to suggest 
that it was common for the East German jurists of the 1980s to chal- 
lenge or subvert the orders of the Party-state. They were still the 
servants of this state, were still used to bow to its authority. But the 
declarations of respect and loyalty for the Party that once seemed 
natural and legitimate must have become increasingly embarrassing 
to GDR lawyers as the years wore on. They now knew more and bet- 
ter. They were professionals. By the time the Wall collapsed, most of 
them, I suspect, liked the law better than the Party. 
It is thus not surprising that the liberalizing influences in the 
last decade of East German legal thought and practice came from the 
most sophisticated and best-trained lawyers in the country: those at 
the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the universities. GDR 
law reform was driven from above. It was not a response to profes- 
sional unrest at the local level. East German trial court judges of the 
1980s were better trained and technically more fastidious than their 
predecessors. But the highly centralized and authoritarian judicial 
system in the GDR in which lower courts were tightly directed and 
supervised by superior courts had also taught them not to stick their 
necks out. As a result, trial court judges were politically and doctri- 
nally more cautious than their higher-ups. They also were more en- 
meshed in local politics and closer to the people and therefore more 
likely to share the popular habits and beliefs bred by Socialism. 
When in the 1980s, the jurists in Berlin imposed more rule-of-law 
restraints on the work of lower courts, they were struggling with an 
ironic task: to teach judicial independence by commanding their sub- 
ordinates to be less subservient to authority. No wonder that the re- 
cipients of these orders had difficulties complying. After 40 years of 
Socialism, East German law reformers were stumbling over obstacles 
of their own construction. 
Again, my Lüritz data can provide examples. Despite high-level 
deliberations about the accuracy of confessions that began in 1978 
and gained momentum after an erroneous conviction in 1982 set off a 
discussion on the rules of evidence among East German experts,77 
the number of withdrawn confessions in my Lüritz files remained 
minimal even after I encountered that first recantation by Herr 
Fuchs' client in 1984. Despite a decade of Supreme Court guidelines 
and decisions that warned against the undifferentiated criminaliza- 
tion of work evasion,78 prison penalties for Asoziale dropped in Lüritz 
77. The development is traced in Jörg Arnold, Die Normalität des Strafrechts des 
DDR , vol. II, Die gerichtliche Überprüfung von Geständnis und Geständniswiderruf 
im Strafverfahren (Freiburg 1996). 
78. See supra nn. 70-72 and accompanying text. 
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no more than from an average of 18 months in 1980 to an average of 
17 months in 1988. And it took campaign-style efforts by the Minis- 
try of Justice to persuade local judges to no longer rubberstamp 
prosecutorial requests for arrest warrants but to carefully examine in 
each case whether an accused's pre-trial detention was truly war- 
ranted.79 Between 1982 and 1985, Lüritz judges had denied only one 
out of 559 applications for arrest warrants by local prosecutors. After 
briefings at several "judge's conferences" in 1987 and 1988, the per- 
centage of prosecutorial requests denied increased to 4% in 1987 and 
5% in 1988 - a gain, but not a real victory for judicial independence. 
By occupational temperament and political persuasion, my 
Lüritz judges stood between the more sophisticated high-court judges 
and the Lüritz man or woman in the street. They were positiviste: 
both out of a professional sense of duty and because strict adherence 
to the letter of the law provided the best shield against potential in- 
terference by outsiders. Like their superiors in Berlin, my Lüritz 
judges respected the law and wanted to get their legal answers right. 
Like their Lüritz clients, my judges believed in the parental obliga- 
tions of the State. Occasionally, they functioned as mediators be- 
tween an increasingly more formal legal system and a public 
increasingly more cynical about the law. When in 1981 a group of 
angry citizens staged a "public forum" in the regional capital to ask 
for harsher penalties for Assis, local judges intervened to explain why 
the law chose to be less repressive than in earlier years. As a Lüritz 
judge once told me, she and her colleagues were quite pleased to be 
able to respond to popular complaints about excessive lenience (leni- 
ence?) towards Asoziale by blaming it on the Supreme Court's in- 
structions. Her statement illustrates the mixture of convictions 
fueling her daily work: respect for legal rules and faith in the legiti- 
macy of orders from above. 
So who were the players in East Germany's legal system on the 
eve of its disintegration? A legal elite increasingly convinced of the 
need for law reform. Foot-soldiers of the law who believed in law but 
also in order and discipline. Consumers of the law with little use or 
respect for laws and courts. And among all protagonists, the faith in 
Socialism and its promises was dwindling. Some of the prerequisites 
for fundamental legal change were present in the GDR of 1989: ris- 
ing professionalism and that distrust of utopian goals that makes us 
look for reliable procedural ways of solving conflicts. But other fea- 
tures of East German legal culture stood in the way of change: reli- 
ance on a parental state, intolerance of outsiders, and a need for 
public order and security that only in the last years of the GDR began 
to clash with new demands for individual autonomy. I have not even 
mentioned what may have been the biggest obstacle to rule-of-law 
79. See supra n. 74. 
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reforms: one-party rule and a planned economy. Law needs self-de- 
termination, egotism, conflict, competition, choice, bargaining, and 
the universal usefulness of money if it is to flourish. No wonder that 
it never could gain real power under Socialism. 
If there was one area of East German social life where rules of 
conduct resembled those for legal interactions in the West, it was the 
black market. In the black market, self-serving and autonomous in- 
dividuals engaged in mutually beneficial deals. Money was impor- 
tant. You got what you paid for. As a Lüritz architect who did a lot of 
moonlighting in the days of Socialism once explained to me: "That 
was when an honest handshake still counted." Indeed, I should have 
listed the growing importance of the black market in the 1980s as one 
of the symptoms signaling the approach of legal change in the GDR. 
Consider used car sales in Lüritz. Since it took between seven 
and fifteen years on a waiting list to buy a new car from a state dis- 
tributor, most people looking for a car had to buy it used from a pri- 
vate owner. Private car sales were legal only if the price stayed 
within the limits of an official estimate of the car's value. Such esti- 
mates calculated the price of a used car as a fraction of the artificially 
low prices at which the state itself sold its new cars to those who had 
survived the trials of the waiting list. This official price bore no rela- 
tion to the value set by supply and demand in the used-car market. 
Cars were extraordinarily scarce in the GDR. Prospective buyers 
gladly offered two or three times the official price for any car that 
looked like it might run. As a result, most private car deals violated 
price restrictions. 
Under East German law, contracts that violated price restric- 
tions were not void but valid at the officially permitted price.80 If 
both parties to such a purchase had acted "in a morally offensive 
manner," the prosecutor could confiscate the excess price for the state 
treasury.81 If only the seller was at fault, the buyer could keep the 
car and sue the seller for a refund of the excess price. In the 1970s, 
prosecutors frequently enforced the law against sellers whom they 
considered particularly offensive "speculators." But by the middle 
1980s, law enforcement officers had largely resigned themselves to 
economic realities. It seemed absurd to call the sale of used cars at 
prices that reflected their value in a hungry market "morally offen- 
sive." Police no longer intervened in the illegal car fairs springing up 
everywhere in the GDR. At the Lüritz fair, on a big field behind the 
old city ramparts, prospective sellers would simply park their cars, 
roll down the window far enough to allow prospective buyers to drop 
in a slip of paper with their offers, and accept the highest bid. 
80. ZGB, supra n. 22, § 68 para. II. 
81. ZGB § 69 Para. II. 
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Many of these deals were sealed with "an honest handshake" and 
never came to the attention of the law. But as the fairs became more 
commonplace, the crypto-capitalist morality of the black market be- 
gan to erode. Buyers, increasingly resentful of paying astronomic 
sums for old jalopies, began to use the court as a kind of sales insur- 
ance. If their newly acquired car did not live up to expectations, they 
brought it in for an official estimate and then sued the seller for a 
refund of his "excess gain," often 50% or more of the actual selling 
price. The court knew, of course, that in the GDR no reasonable man 
would part with as precious a possession as a car, however rackety, at 
the official price. But law is law, and Lüritz judges, positivists that 
they were, in "excess price" cases always sided with the buyer. 
I find these cases intriguing because they reflect an open clash of 
legal cultures that in earlier years would have been unimaginable. 
On the one hand, there were the rules of the black market relying on 
the honesty, and often, just the instantaneous performance, of people 
cutting their own deals. On the other hand, there was the law, trying 
to keep everyone in line by punishing sellers for what officially was 
considered excessive greed and by protecting buyers against their 
own risky purchases. Lüritz citizens moved back and forth between 
both legal worlds as it suited their interests. Buying a used car 
under this mix of rules no longer meant that you had to be on your 
guard not to be saddled with a lemon. Most people in my files reached 
their decisions very quickly. Often, they did not even ask to test 
drive their prospective purchases. Maybe they did not dare to ask: 
this was a sellers' market and they may have feared alienating the 
seller with too many questions. In any case, most Lüritz car buyers 
eagerly consented to the asking price and paid it. Of those who later 
had regrets about their bargains, the more assertive (or maybe the 
more ruthless) went to court to sue the seller for the return of the 
illegal portion of his price. The number of "excess price" suits on the 
Lüritz docket rose. Some of these suits make the eventual reader of 
these files shake her head in wonder. Here is one of them. On a fall 
evening in 1989, a prospective buyer spots a 23-year old Trabant on 
the auto market. Since it is already dark, he examines it as best he 
can under a streetlamp, finds many faults, tries unsuccessfully to 
bargain with the seller who wants to go home, and finally, afraid to 
lose his chance to buy the Trabi, pays the asking price of 10,000 
marks in cash. A few weeks later, an official valuation of the car es- 
tablishes a "legal" value of 4,100 marks. Should the impatient buyer 
not bear the risk of his own stupidity? Not under the parental gui- 
dance of the Lüritz court. With the judge's approval, buyer and seller 
settle on an "agreement" under which the buyer receives a refund of 
roughly half of the "excess price." "Don't worry," the Lüritz judges 
seem to say to him and other people yearning for a car. "You don't 
have to look out for your own interests. We'll do it for you." 
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As used-car deals became more prone to be unraveled by a court 
decision, sellers tried to protect themselves by concluding two con- 
tracts with their buyers: a written one at the official price to use in 
court if the necessity should arise, and an oral one which set the price 
that the prospective buyer had to pay to get his car. Buyers coun- 
tered that strategy by secretly posting witnesses in earshot of the 
parties' dealings who later could testify in court about the actual 
price the purchaser had paid. Sellers, suspecting the presence of hos- 
tile witnesses, brought strong friends along to the negotiations who 
could deal with them. Sometimes, buyers short-circuited the need for 
litigation by paying the asking price with envelopes supposedly 
stuffed with money of which only the "legal" price consisted of real 
bills with the illegal rest made up of paper padding. These and simi- 
lar happenings increasingly filled the docket of the Lüritz court. 
Some people took the law into their own hands. If violence erupted at 
the Lüritz auto market, the police would often look the other way. 
Neither official nor unofficial rules seemed to be capable any longer of 
civilizing used-car sales in the GDR. Here is how a Lüritz buyer de- 
scribed the situation in his brief: "Anyone interested can see what 
happens when cars are changing hands at our auto fairs and else- 
where. These exchanges are governed by the laws of supply and de- 
mand and by enormous legal insecurity." And from the brief of a 
disappointed seller: "What kind of contracts are these? People use 
them any way it suits their purposes." 
But in 1987, a surprising case reached the Lüritz Kreisgericht. 
The plaintiff was Herr Klemm, an enterprising man who made a liv- 
ing by buying and reselling used cars for a profit and in such num- 
bers that even at this late date, the prosecutor could no longer ignore 
his business. Herr Klemm, accordingly, had recently been convicted 
of speculation on ten counts; his sentence included the confiscation of 
71,800 marks of illegal profits which he was ordered to pay to the city 
of Lüritz. Where to find the money? With Herr Fuchs (whom else?) 
as his attorney, Herr Klemm decides to sue several of his own suppli- 
ers for refunds of those "excess prices" that he had to pay himself in 
order to obtain the cars that he would later sell to his black market 
customers. 
The Lüritz judge is outraged: if such suits prevailed, a specula- 
tor could recoup the penalties that he owed the state and go, in fact, 
unpunished! She tries to persuade the prosecutor to apply for the 
confiscation of the "excess price" obtained by Herr Klemm's suppliers, 
but without success. She tries to convince the city government of 
Lüritz to expropriate the money under an applicable city ordinance 
but finds that nobody is interested. She finally dismisses Herr 
Klemm's suit. But he appeals, and Herr Fuchs persuades the Re- 
gional Court to approve of a settlement under which his client is com- 
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pensateti for roughly half of the "surplus prices" he had to pay his 
own suppliers. The black market had entered a socialist courtroom. 
Official and unofficial morality had cut a deal. A private lawsuit had 
undermined the state's criminalization of market activities. 
I would have liked to see the continuation of the story. It would 
have been interesting to watch whether East German law reform 
could, over time, have managed to extricate itself from the constraint 
of Socialism, and if so, how. But history intercepted that experiment. 
In the event, die Wende caught East Germans unprepared. Very few 
people were ready for a legal system built on self-interest and self- 
assertion. Ordinary people were too accustomed to a state that not 
only constrained but also sheltered them. East German legal profes- 
sionals would have been most suited to a world in which formality 
and procedure mattered again. But given the prevailing mood in post- 
reunification Germany, they were also most likely to be condemned 
as servants of an evil state and therefore largely were excluded from 
positions of authority in the new Rechtsstaat .82 Former black mar- 
keteers and people with energy and elbow seem to have done alright. 
And as the steep rise of litigation figures after 1990 suggests,83 East 
German newcomers do make use of their new law. Whether they 
trust it, and how long it will take them to replace their cynicism from 
the waning years of Socialism with faith in as detached and difficult a 
civil religion as the rule of law is another matter.84 
Postscript 
You may have noticed a fair amount of "it seems'" and "that must 
have been the reasons" in this essay. The past is a treacherous ter- 
rain, not any safer, really, than the future, and I worry about my 
many guesses and about the misinterpretations that I may have 
made along the road to tell my Lüritz story. But here is one mistake 
that it is not too late to rectify. Remember Frau Haas and her sud- 
den disappearance from the Lüritz files? With Frau Rüter's help, I 
found another witness to her story: Frau Haas's surviving daughter 
who lives in a town a train-hour from Lüritz. 
82. See Markovits, "Children of a Lesser God: GDR Lawyers in Post-Socialist Ger- 
many, " 94 Mich . L. Rev . 2270 (1996). 
83. In 1988, a total of 62,210 first-instance civil suits were filed in the GDR; see 
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1989 p. 399. In the 
first hree years after eunification, civil litigation in the five new East German states 
rose from a total of 76,800 new suits filed in 1991 to a total of 317,600 suits filed in 
1994. Reported by Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, "Wege zur Justizentlastung," 48 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2441 (1995). 
84. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewußtsein imwiedervereinigten Deutsch- 
land, 14 Zeitschrift ür Rechtssoziologie p. 121, 123-25 (1995) reports on a 1995 opin- 
ion poll according to which 60% of East Germans older than 16 years are not satisfied 
with the state of law and the courts in the Federal Republic (West Germans: 36%), 
72% of East Germans do not feel protected by the law (West Germans: 33%), and 53% 
of East Germans do not consider Germany to be a just society (West Germans: 28%). 
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I asked the daughter for an explanation of her mother's dismissal 
from the Lüritz court. Yes, Frau Haas indeed had often quarreled 
with the prosecutor's office. And her son's fatal attempt to flee the 
country contributed to the mother's problems at the Lüritz court. But 
as I listened to the daughter's account of her mother's life, I suddenly 
realized: I had gotten my dates wrong. I had missed a time-gap. Two 
and a half years had passed between Dieter Haas' death in the Medi- 
terranean and his mother's departure from Lüritz. Yes, her superiors 
at the Ministry of Justice wanted to avoid the political embarrass- 
ment and the tensions among the legal staff in town that they feared 
would be caused by Frau Haas' continued presence at the Kreisge- 
richt. But they did not want to lose a competent and loyal judge. It 
took two and a half years to find a suitable alternative position for 
Frau Haas: she became director of a larger trial court in another 
town. She died in the summer of 1989 of a heart attack, while sewing 
a dress that she had intended to wear at the Supreme Court's 40th 
birthday celebration when she and other worthy judges in the GDR 
were to be honored with a medal. That birthday celebration did not 
happen, either. Socialism did not live long enough to see its date: De- 
cember 8, 1989. But it seems right to end an essay that has tried to 
connect the life of a legal system with the lives of people living under 
it by remembering one of them whose own life was marked by Social- 
ism's hopes, its disappointments, its successes, and its blackest 
failure. 
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